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DIVERSITY WITHIN RACIAL GROUPS AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RACE-CONSCIOUS ADMISSIONS 
Vinay Harpalani! 
ABSTRACT 
This Article offers a novel doctrinal resolution of the key issues in Fisher v. Texas, the impending 
Supreme Court case which involves race-conscious admissions policies at the University of Texas at 
Austin (“UT”).  The resolution proposed here addresses Justice Anthony Kennedy’s concerns about 
race-conscious policies, but also preserves most of the Court’s 2003 Grutter v. Bollinger ruling, 
in spite of the fact that Justice Kennedy dissented in Grutter.  Substantively, the Article clarifies 
the key issues in Fisher (the meaning of “critical mass” and the scope of deference that courts give 
to universities) by focusing on a simple idea that permeates Grutter and Fisher but has not been 
analyzed in the scholarly literature to date:  the significance of diversity within racial groups.  It 
argues that under Grutter, a race-conscious policy can aim not only to increase minority 
representation overall, but also to increase diversity within racial groups.  Moreover, the Article 
contends that diversity within racial groups is key to understanding the constitutionality of race-
conscious admissions policies for several reasons:  1. Within-group diversity elucidates clearly how 
a “critical mass” of minority students is different from numerical goals and quotas; 2. Within-
group diversity directly reflects the compelling interest in educational diversity at the classroom 
level that was articulated in Grutter—the breakdown of racial stereotypes and the facilitation of 
cross-racial understanding through admission of a “critical mass”; 3.  A holistic admissions policy 
that emphasizes within-group diversity reduces the stigmatic harm of race-conscious measures; and 
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4. Attaining diversity within racial groups necessitates a degree of deference to universities in their 
admissions policies.  Nevertheless, after reviewing the basic substantive issues in Fisher, the 
Article also illustrates how the Fifth Circuit could have been less deferential to UT in its Fisher 
ruling.  It distinguishes between three different categories of deference to universities—
implementation of race-conscious policies, educational objectives related to racial diversity, and 
need for race-conscious policies—and analyzes the appropriate standard of review for each.  The 
third category, need for race-conscious policies, is the issue at play in Fisher, and the Article 
contends that Justice Kennedy’s view on this issue will be outcome determinative in Fisher.  The 
Article then proposes a different analysis to decide Fisher—the “unique contribution to diversity” 
test—which focuses on within-group diversity and applies strict scrutiny rather than the “good 
faith” standard adopted by the Fifth Circuit. These distinctions are directly reflective of the 
concerns raised in Justice Kennedy’s Grutter dissent.  Finally, the Article highlights a key values 
conflict that Justice Kennedy will face when deciding Fisher:  the tension the case presents between 
diversity in higher education and racial segregation in K-12 schooling. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2013, when it rules in the case of Fisher v. Texas,1 the United 
States Supreme Court will revisit one of the most contentious issues it 
has decided in recent decades:  the constitutionality of race-conscious 
admissions policies in higher education.  In 2003, a fractured Court 
upheld such policies in Grutter v. Bollinger,2 with a 5-4 majority opin-
ion authored by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor.  While Grutter was 
clear in its approval of race-conscious policies to pursue educational 
diversity as a compelling interest, it left open some contentious ques-
tions:  the meaning of a “critical mass” of minority students and the 
scope of deference given to universities regarding the use of race-
conscious policies.  These will be the key issues as the Court decides 
Fisher and determines the constitutionality of the University of Texas 
at Austin’s (“UT”) undergraduate admissions policy. 
Justice Anthony Kennedy’s swing vote will likely be outcome-
determinative in Fisher.3  Justice Kennedy dissented from the holding 
 
 1 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213 (2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (Feb. 21, 2012).  
Oral arguments in Fisher occurred on October 10, 2012.  See Transcript of Oral Argument 
at 1, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (2012) (No. 11-345). 
 2 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 3 Justice Elena Kagan has recused herself from Fisher because of her role in the case, as So-
licitor General, when it was still in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tex-
as.  Based on their prior jurisprudence, Justices Samuel Alito, Antonin Scalia, and Clar-
ence Thomas, along with Chief Justice Roberts, will likely vote to overrule the Fifth Cir-
Circuit in Fisher, and to substantially curb or even overturn Grutter.  See generally Grutter, 
539 U.S. at 346–87 (Scalia, J. dissenting; Thomas, J., dissenting) (expressing disdain for 
the Grutter majority’s approval of race-conscious admissions policies); Parents Involved in 
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (striking down a race-conscious 
admissions policy).  Justices Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Sonia Sotomayor 
will likely vote to uphold the Fifth Circuit’s Fisher ruling, or at least to keep Grutter intact.  
See generally Grutter, 539 U.S. at 311–45 (majority opinion upholding race-conscious ad-
missions policy joined by Justices Breyer and Ginsburg); Charlie Savage, Videos Shed New 
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in Grutter,4 but he did not completely rebuff the use of race as an ad-
missions factor;5 moreover, his race and equal protection jurispru-
dence has been evolving over time.6  So the overarching question in 
 
Light on Sotomayor’s Positions, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2009, at A17, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/11/us/politics/11judge.html (noting that Justice So-
tomayor “once described herself as ‘a product of affirmative action’” and “thought it was 
‘critical that we promote diversity’”).  If Justice Kennedy votes with Justices Breyer, Gins-
burg, and Sotomayor, the Court would vote to a 4-4 tie and automatically affirm the Fifth 
Circuit opinion in Fisher.  Thus, Justice Kennedy’s resolution of the case will be key.  See 
also Allen Rostron, Affirmative Action, Justice Kennedy, and the Virtues of the Middle Ground, 
107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 74, 77 (2012) (noting that when the Supreme Court de-
cides Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., “Justice Kennedy’s vote would carry the day regardless of 
whether Kagan participates in the case”). 
 4 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  The question presented to the Su-
preme Court in Fisher is narrowly framed to include Grutter as precedent:  “Whether this 
Court’s decisions interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, including Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), permit the University of Texas at 
Austin’s use of race in undergraduate admissions decisions.”  See Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari at i, Fisher, No. 11-345, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/11-
00345qp.pdf.  Thus, Justice Kennedy and the Court might not reconsider Grutter itself, 
but just aim to clarify it. 
 5 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 392–93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“There is no constitutional objec-
tion to the goal of considering race as one modest factor among many others to achieve 
diversity . . . .”).  Moreover, although Justice Kennedy dissented in Grutter, he did agree 
with the Grutter majority’s affirmance of Justice Lewis Powell’s opinion in Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).  See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387 (Kennedy, 
J., dissenting) (“The opinion by Justice Powell, in my view, states the correct rule for de-
ciding the case . . . . Justice Powell’s approval of the use of race in university admissions 
reflected a tradition, grounded in the First Amendment, of acknowledging a university’s 
conception of its educational mission.”).  In Bakke, four Justices voted to strike down the 
University of California at Davis Medical School special admissions program, which set 
aside sixteen of one hundred spots in each admitted class for members of minority 
groups, and four Justices voted to uphold the admissions policy.  438 U.S. at 272, 275, 
320, 325–26.  Justice Powell voted to strike down the UC Davis program, but wrote that 
race could be used as a “plus” factor for achieving the compelling state interest of diversi-
ty in education.  Id. at 317 (Powell, J., concurring) (affirming the constitutionality of “an 
admissions program[,] [where] race or ethnic background may be deemed a ‘plus’ in a 
particular applicant’s file . . . [but] does not insulate the individual from comparison with 
all other candidates for the available seats”).  Justice Powell’s concurring opinion was cit-
ed as support for this proposition in Grutter.  See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 307 (“[T]he Court 
endorses Justice Powell’s view that student body diversity is a compelling state interest in 
the context of university admissions.”). 
 6 See Heather K. Gerken, Justice Kennedy and the Domains of Equal Protection, 121 HARV. L. 
REV. 104, 130 (2007) (noting that “Justice Kennedy’s opinions in LULAC and Parents In-
volved invite us to abandon our monolithic stories about race and think about equal pro-
tection in domain-centered terms”).  See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 
548 U.S. 399 (2006) (Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion recognizing the interests of dif-
ferent Latino groups in political representation); Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 797 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“A compelling interest ex-
ists in avoiding racial isolation . . . .”).  Professor Gerken also observes that in Parents 
Involved, “Justice Kennedy . . . makes a remarkably similar argument [to Justice 
O’Connor’s argument in Grutter]. . . , even observing that public schools could use a Grut-
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Fisher is how much, if at all, will Justice Kennedy curb the use of race-
conscious policies?7  And the answer to this question depends on Jus-
tice Kennedy’s view of the two key issues in Fisher:  critical mass and 
deference. 
This Article offers a novel doctrinal resolution of the key issues in 
Fisher—a resolution which preserves the Grutter holding but also ad-
dresses the concerns in Justice Kennedy’s Grutter dissent.  The Article 
clarifies the meaning of “critical mass” and the scope of deference 
given to universities by focusing on a simple idea that permeates Grut-
ter and Fisher but which has not been explicated to date:  the signifi-
cance of diversity within racial groups.8  It argues that a race-conscious 
 
ter-like admissions policy as a last resort.”  Gerken, supra note 6, at 117.  See also Parents In-
volved, 551 U.S. at 797–98 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment) (“[A] district may consider it a compelling interest to achieve a diverse student 
population.  Race may be one component of that diversity, but other demographic fac-
tors, plus special talents and needs, should also be considered.”). 
 7 Other commentators also note that Justice Kennedy probably will not completely pre-
clude the use of race in admissions.  See, e.g., Tomiko Brown-Nagin, The Diversity Paradox:  
Judicial Review in an Age of Demographic and Educational Change, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 
113, 117 (2012) (noting that in Fisher, “the decisive vote of Justice Anthony Kenne-
dy . . . likely will preclude repudiation of Grutter’s central holding”); Lyle Denniston, Con-
stitution Check:  Is Affirmative Action in College Admissions Doomed?, HUFFPOST COLLEGE (Feb. 
23, 2012, 11:49 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lyle-denniston/affirmative-
action_b_1294671.html (“Looking back to what Kennedy wrote in dissent in 2003, he re-
called with approval Justice Powell’s view that a university admissions program ‘may take 
account of race as one, nonpredominant factor in a system designed to consider each ap-
plicant as an individual’. . . . Justice Kennedy has been somewhat more flexible on race is-
sues than some of his conservative colleagues, and he may not yet be ready to cast aside 
altogether the use of race as ‘one, nonpredominant factor.’”).  Some commentators have 
also contended that Justice Kennedy will very likely narrow the scope of race-conscious 
admissions in Fisher.  See Rostron, supra note 3, at 78 (contending that in Fisher, “the most 
likely outcome is that Kennedy will . . . refus[e] to put a complete stop to affirmative ac-
tion, but insist[] . . . that rigorous strict scrutiny really and truly will apply”); see also 
Vikram David Amar, Is Honesty the Best (Judicial) Policy in Affirmative Action Cases?  Fisher v. 
University of Texas Gives the Court (Yet) Another Chance to Say Yes, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN 
BANC. 77, 88 (2012) (contending that “the most likely Fisher result is . . . [one in which] 
[t]he window for race-based affirmative action in higher education will be narrowed, but 
left ever-so-slightly open” (footnote omitted)). 
 8 This Article will use the phrases “diversity within racial groups” and “within-group diversi-
ty” interchangeably.  “Intra-racial diversity” and “intra-group diversity” are also synony-
mous terms.  All of these terms refer to the variety of viewpoints and experiences that ex-
ist among members of the same racial group.  It should be noted that while the 
implications of within-group diversity for the constitutionality of race-conscious admis-
sions have not been considered, there has been scholarly attention to within-group diver-
sity in admissions from a social justice perspective.  For example, Professors Kevin Brown 
and Jeanine Bell advocate for universities to distinguish between different Black groups, 
such as Black immigrants (from Africa and the Caribbean), multiracial persons, Black La-
tinos, and African Americans, when implementing their race-conscious admissions poli-
cies.  See Kevin Brown & Jeannine Bell, Demise of the Talented Tenth:  Affirmative Action and 
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policy can aim not only to increase minority representation overall, 
but also to increase diversity within racial groups—a point which has 
not been analyzed in scholarly discourse on Grutter or Fisher.  Moreo-
ver, the Article contends that diversity within racial groups is key to 
understanding the constitutionality of race-conscious admissions pol-
icies for several reasons:  1.  Within-group diversity elucidates how a 
critical mass of minority students is different from numerical goals 
and quotas; 2.  Within-group diversity directly reflects the compelling 
interest in educational diversity at the classroom level that was articu-
lated in Grutter—the breakdown of racial stereotypes and the facilita-
tion of cross-racial understanding through admission of a critical 
mass; 3.  A holistic admissions policy that emphasizes within-group di-
versity reduces the stigmatic harm of race-conscious measures; and 4.  
Attaining diversity within racial groups necessitates a degree of defer-
ence to universities in their admissions policies.  Nevertheless, after 
reviewing the basic substantive issues in Fisher,9 the Article also illus-
trates how the Fifth Circuit could have been less deferential to UT in 
its Fisher ruling, and it proposes a different method for resolving the 
case. 
 
the Increasing Underrepresentation of Ascendant Blacks at Selective Higher Educational Institutions, 
69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1229, 1231 (2008) (questioning admissions policies “that lump[] all 
blacks into a single-category approach that pervades admissions decisions of so many se-
lective colleges, universities, and graduate programs”).  Professors Brown and Bell further 
note that given “the growing percentage of blacks with a white parent and foreign-born 
black immigrants and their sons and daughters” at selective institutions, “blacks whose 
predominate racial and ethnic heritage is traceable to the historical oppression of blacks 
in the U.S. are far more underrepresented than administrators, admissions committees, 
and faculties realize.”  Id.  See also Kevin Brown, Should Black Immigrants Be Favored Over 
Black Hispanics and Black Multiracials in the Admissions Processes of Selective Higher Education 
Programs?, 54 HOW. L.J. 255, 302 (2011) (arguing that “admissions committees of selective 
higher education institutions should not provide treatment that is more favorable to 
Black Immigrant applicants”).  Professors Henry Louis Gates and Lani Guinier have 
raised similar concerns.  See Cara Anna, Immigrants among blacks at colleges raises diversity 
questions, BOSTON GLOBE (Apr. 30, 2007), http://www.boston.com/news/
education/higher/articles/2007/04/30/immigrants_among_blacks_at_colleges_raises_
diversity_questions/?page=2 (“The issue of native vs. immigrant blacks took hold at Har-
vard in 2004, when professors Henry Louis Gates and Lani Guinier pointed out at a black 
alumni reunion that a majority of attendees were of African or Caribbean origin.”). 
 9 This Article analyzes the merits issues in Fisher; it does not address procedural challenges, 
including standing and mootness, that UT raised in its response to the plaintiffs’ petition 
for certiorari.  See Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Fisher v. Univ. of 
Tex. (2012) (No. 11-345).  For a discussion of these issues, see Amar, supra note 7, at 12–
18; Adam D. Chandler, How (Not) to Bring an Affirmative-Action Challenge, 122 YALE L.J. 
(forthcoming Sept. 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2122956 (arguing that 
there are significant procedural defects in Fisher). 
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Part I provides the background on Grutter’s holding that enroll-
ment of a critical mass of minority students is a compelling state in-
terest.  This Part illustrates that the chief educational benefits of di-
versity espoused in Grutter are the breakdown of racial stereotypes 
and the facilitation of cross-racial understanding—by showing White 
students that minority students from each group have a “variety of 
viewpoints.”10  Consequently, a “critical mass” of minority students re-
fers not only to numerical representation of racial groups, but also to 
the diversity of viewpoints and experiences within each group, which 
contribute to the educational benefits of diversity articulated in Grut-
ter.  This view of “critical mass” is different from other notions of the 
concept that focus narrowly on numbers or define it by feelings of 
isolation encountered by minority students.  Thus, this Part shows 
how “critical mass” is distinct from numerical goals and quotas, which 
was one of Justice Kennedy’s key concerns in his Grutter dissent.  Ul-
timately, this Part argues that “critical mass” is not a measurable enti-
ty—it is a concept which articulates a university’s compelling interest 
in diversity, but it is not part of the narrow tailoring test for race-
conscious admissions policies. 
Part II expands upon this discussion by showing how within-group 
diversity and critical mass are related to Grutter’s narrow tailoring 
principles—thus illustrating the internal logic and coherence of a 
much-maligned Grutter majority opinion.11  It argues that Grutter’s 
narrow tailoring principles aim to minimize the stigmatic harm12 of 
 
 10 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 319–20 (“[W]hen a critical mass of underrepresented minority stu-
dents is present, racial stereotypes lose their force because nonminority students learn 
there is no ‘minority viewpoint’ but rather a variety of viewpoints among minority stu-
dents.”). 
 11 See, e.g., James F. Blumstein, Grutter and Fisher:  A Reassessment and a Preview, 65 VAND. L. 
REV. EN BANC 57, 64 (2012) (discussing “problems with and perverse implications of the 
student body diversity rationale Grutter adopts for justifying the use of racial preferences 
in the context of higher education students admissions”); Roger Clegg, Attacking “Diversi-
ty”:  A Review of Peter Wood’s Diversity:  The Invention of a Concept, 31 J.C. & U.L. 417, 431 
(2005) (claiming that “the Grutter Court relied on this rather convoluted reasoning” in its 
articulation of diversity as a compelling interest); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 
247 (5th Cir. 2011) (Garza, J., specially concurring) (“Grutter represents a digression in 
the course of constitutional law . . . .”).  Even proponents of affirmative action have been 
critical of Grutter’s emphasis on diversity instead of racial justice.  See, e.g., Derrick Bell, 
Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1622 (2003) (“[T]he concept of diversity, 
far from a viable means of ensuring affirmative action in the admissions policies of col-
leges and graduate schools, is a serious distraction in the ongoing efforts to achieve racial 
justice.”). 
 12 Stigmatic harm is the constitutional harm that occurs when a government policy treats 
individuals in the same manner solely because of their race.  For a more detailed discus-
sion of stigmatic harm, see infra Part II.A. 
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race-conscious policies by ensuring that members of the same racial 
group are given individualized consideration and not treated in ex-
actly the same manner—the “least stigmatic means” theory of narrow 
tailoring.13  This Part also argues that, in addition to its educational 
benefits, within-group diversity helps to minimize stigmatic harm.  
Accordingly, within-group diversity links critical mass and narrow tai-
loring and highlights the internal logic and coherence of the Grutter 
majority opinion.  Furthermore, a race-conscious policy can aim not 
only to increase representation of different racial groups, but also to 
generate diversity within racial groups.  Finally, the analysis in this 
Part illustrates how within-group diversity and narrow tailoring are re-
lated to courts’ deference to universities’ decisions in determining 
their admissions policies. 
Part III focuses the application of critical mass and deference in 
Fisher.  It first gives the background to Fisher, including the Fifth Cir-
cuit’s 1996 decision in Hopwood v. Texas,14 the enactment of the “race-
neutral”15 Top Ten Percent Law, and the reinstatement of race-
conscious admissions after Grutter.  Next, this Part considers the par-
ties’ arguments regarding critical mass and deference, the Fifth Cir-
cuit’s ruling on these issues, and Chief Judge Edith Jones’s critique of 
this ruling in her dissent to the denial of an en banc hearing in Fish-
 
 13 This Article argues that reducing the stigmatic harm of race-conscious admissions policies 
is a key facet of Grutter, particularly for the narrow tailoring requirements and the critical 
mass concept.  See infra Part II.B.  It does not, however, take a normative stance on wheth-
er reducing such stigmatic harm should be a major concern. 
 14 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 15 This Article presumes, as the Fisher litigation did, that the Top Ten Percent Law is “race-
neutral”—meaning that there is no direct and explicit consideration of race in the deci-
sion-making process.  Fisher, 644 F.3d at 306 (“Under that race-neutral law . . . the top ten 
percent of graduates from every Texas high school were automatically admitted, and 
many African-American and Hispanic students matriculated to the University.”).  But see 
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 303 n.10 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Calling . . . 
10% or 20% plans ‘race-neutral’ seems to me disingenuous, for they ‘unquestionably 
were adopted with the specific purpose of increasing representation of African-Americans 
and Hispanics in the public higher education system.’” (quoting Brief for Respondents at 
44, Gratz, 539 U.S. 244 (No. 02-516))).  See also Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 242 
n.156 (5th Cir. 2011) (“A court considering the constitutionality of the [Top Ten Percent 
Law] would examine whether Texas enacted the Law (and corresponding admissions pol-
icies) because of its effects on identifiable racial groups or in spite of those effects.”); 
Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 259, 279 (1979) (finding a state statute giv-
ing preference to veterans for civil service positions constitutional because the state legis-
lature did not enact the law “because of” but merely “in spite of” the law’s adverse effects 
on women); Brief of Social Scientists Glenn C. Loury et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 9–10, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (Nos. 02-241, 02-516) (noting that it is unclear 
whether percentage plans are in fact race-neutral and that some amici counsel in Grutter 
have signaled interest in challenging these percentage plans in subsequent litigation). 
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er.16  It then critiques the application of critical mass in Fisher, con-
cluding that “critical mass” and numerical goals were indistinguisha-
ble in the Fifth Circuit’s analysis of the case.  Moreover, this Part also 
illustrates how the Fisher panel’s deference to UT did not leave suffi-
cient room for judicial review.  In the process, this Part underscores 
how critical mass and deference will be key points for Justice Kennedy 
when deciding Fisher. 
Part IV addresses standard of review and deference in detail.  It 
lays out three categories of review with respect to deference to uni-
versities:  1. Review of the actual implementation of race-conscious 
policies as implemented, which requires strict scrutiny; 2. Review of 
whether the university’s educational objective encompasses racial di-
versity (essentially, whether the university has a compelling interest in 
diversity), which requires only “good faith” on the part of the univer-
sity; and 3. Review of whether race-conscious admissions policies are 
needed to attain this educational objective, which is the core issue in 
Fisher and the source of controversy.  Focusing on the third category, 
this Part distinguishes between ex ante deference (before a university 
applies a race-neutral policy to increase diversity) and ex post defer-
ence (after a university applies a race-neutral policy to increase diver-
sity, as is the case in Fisher after the Top Ten Percent Law was imple-
mented).  This Part then contends that after a race-neutral 
admissions policy has been implemented, it is easier for courts to re-
view the effectiveness of that policy and thus to apply a higher stand-
ard of review such as strict scrutiny. 
Part V proposes an alternative method to decide Fisher, the 
“unique contribution to diversity” test, which applies strict scrutiny.  
The test proposed here does not treat critical mass in terms of num-
bers; in fact, it focuses on the race-conscious admissions policy itself 
rather than on critical mass.  The “unique contribution to diversity” 
test assesses whether a race-conscious policy contributes to diversity in 
a manner above and beyond any race-neutral measures that are in 
place, such as the Top Ten Percent Law in Fisher.  The argument here 
is that UT should have to demonstrate explicitly that its race-
conscious policy is used to increase the variety of viewpoints and ex-
periences among minority students—by admitting minority students 
in different majors, or from different cultural or socioeconomic 
backgrounds who are not admitted in sufficient numbers via the Top 
Ten Percent Law.  Such a goals-means fit is characteristic of strict 
 
 16 Fisher v. Texas, 644 F.3d 301, 303 (5th Cir. 2011) (Jones, C.J., dissenting from the denial 
of en banc rehearing). 
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scrutiny.  This Part then highlights the advantages of the “unique 
contribution to diversity” test and shows how the test addresses Justice 
Kennedy’s dissent in Grutter.  Moreover, the test proposed here also 
resolves a values conflict that Justice Kennedy faces in Fisher:  the pro-
spect that a race-neutral admissions policy (the Top Ten Percent 
Law), which generates diversity only because of rampant racial segre-
gation in public schools, could preclude UT from using race-
conscious admissions measures.  This conflict is key for Justice Ken-
nedy, who stated that “avoiding racial isolation” is a compelling state 
interest in his concurrence in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. 
Seattle School District Number 1.17 
I.  CRITICAL MASS AS A COMPELLING INTEREST:  THE ROLE OF 
DIVERSITY WITHIN RACIAL GROUPS 
In 2003, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor authored the 5-4 majority 
opinion in Grutter, in which the Court upheld the University of Mich-
igan Law School’s holistic admissions policy.18  Grutter adopted Justice 
Lewis Powell’s concurrence in Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke,19 which had introduced the idea of diversity in education as a 
compelling interest.20  The Court held that a holistic admissions poli-
 
 17 551 U.S. 701, 797 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment) (“A compelling interest exists in avoiding racial isolation . . . .”).  In Parents In-
volved, Justice Kennedy also critiqued Chief Justice Roberts’s plurality opinion for its “all-
too-unyielding insistence that race cannot be a factor in instances when, in my view, it 
may be taken into account.”  Id. at 787.  Justice Kennedy further asserted that “[t]o the 
extent the plurality opinion suggests the Constitution mandates that state and local 
school authorities must accept the status quo of racial isolation in schools, it is, in my 
view, profoundly mistaken.”  Id. at 788.  For an excellent scholarly analysis and critique of 
Chief Justice Roberts’s plurality opinion in Parents Involved, see Christopher W. Schmidt, 
Essay, Brown and the Colorblind Constitution, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 203, 206 (2008) (“Once 
one seriously looks to the history of colorblind constitutionalism in the struggle that led 
to Brown . . . the shortcomings of the Chief Justice’s account [in Parents Involved] become 
readily apparent.”). 
 18 This Article defines a holistic admissions policy as one where various factors, from aca-
demic achievement to extracurricular activities to race, are subjectively considered to-
gether and weighed by admissions reviewers to make admissions decisions.  This can be 
contrasted with an admissions system which gives fixed weights to those various factors 
and applies objective, mechanical formulas to determine who should be admitted. 
 19 See supra note 5. 
 20 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311–12 (“The fourth goal asserted by petitioner is the attainment of a 
diverse student body.  This clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution 
of higher education.”).  In his Grutter dissent, Justice Kennedy also made it clear that he 
did not object to the use of race in admissions to obtain the educational benefits of diver-
sity.  See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387–88 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The opinion by  Justice 
Powell [in Bakke], in my view, states the correct rule for resolving this case. . . . Justice 
Powell’s approval of the use of race in university admissions reflected a tradition, ground-
 
472 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:2 
 
cy could use race as one, flexible factor, for the purpose of admitting 
a critical mass of minority students.21  But what exactly is a “critical 
mass”?22 
This is a key question in understanding the constitutionality of 
race-conscious admissions—one that was raised several times during 
the Supreme Court oral argument in Fisher v. Texas.23  The answer has 
remained elusive, and this Part reviews and critiques some different 
interpretations of the critical mass concept.  Then, drawing upon Jus-
 
ed in the First Amendment, of acknowledging a university’s conception of its educational 
mission. . . . Our precedents provide a basis for the Court’s acceptance of a university’s 
considered judgment that racial diversity among students can further its educational 
task . . . .”); see also id. at 392–93 (“There is no constitutional objection to the goal of con-
sidering race as one modest factor among many others to achieve diversity. . . .”). 
 21 Id. at 333 (majority opinion) (“The Law School has determined, based on its experience 
and expertise, that a ‘critical mass’ of underrepresented minorities is necessary to further 
its compelling interest in securing the educational benefits of a diverse student body.”). 
 22 See Adeno Addis, The Concept of Critical Mass in Legal Discourse, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 97 
(2007) (discussing uses of the “critical mass” concept in law).  Professor Addis notes that 
“[i]n the scientific world, the [term “critical mass”] is used to refer to the precise mini-
mum level of fissionable plutonium or uranium that is required to start and sustain a 
chain reaction of nuclear fission which will in turn lead to explosion.”  Id. at 98.  Profes-
sor Addis goes on to observe that:   
While there is a degree of certainty as to what the phrase refers in the scientific 
realm, there does not seem to be such clarity in relation to the application of the 
phrase in the social and political world. . . . It may even be that its popularity is . . . 
partly a function of its vagueness and elasticity that allow people to invoke it in var-
ious activities of social and political life.  Sometimes the phrase is used to refer to 
specific and empirically verifiable minimum numbers of people or levels of re-
sources required for a social activity to succeed . . . . Other times, however, the 
phrase seems to be used not as an analogy but as a metaphor, simply to indicate 
that people’s actions or behavior depend on what others do or on what they ex-
pect others to do without an attempt to specify whether there is a minimum num-
ber or level of resource to trigger those actions or behavior. 
  Id. at 99.  Professor Addis’s observations here show the flaws in directly analogizing be-
tween the scientific and social realms.  Diversity in education is a complex phenomenon 
which cannot be reliably sustained by reaching a particular minimum threshold.  This Ar-
ticle contends that the meaning of “critical mass” is context-specific, and that in Grutter, 
“critical mass” was intended merely as a metaphor to capture the notion of diversity with-
in racial groups.  See infra Part I.C. 
 23 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 14 (Justice Sotomayor asking Plaintiffs’ 
counsel “could you tell me what a critical mass was?”); id. at 20 (Justice Alito asking Plain-
tiffs’ counsel “do you understand what the University of Texas thinks is the definition of a 
critical mass?  Because I don’t.”); id. at 39 (Justice Alito asking UT’s counsel “[d]oes criti-
cal mass vary from group to group?  Does it vary from State to State?”); id. at 45–46 (Chief 
Justice Roberts asking UT’s counsel “you won’t tell me what the critical mass is . . . when 
will we know that you’ve reached a critical mass?”); id. at 70–71 (Justice Scalia stating 
“[w]e should probably stop calling it critical mass . . . [c]all it a cloud or something like 
that.”).  Even at the trial stage of Fisher v. University of Texas, Judge Sam Sparks of the U.S. 
District Court for the Western District of Texas noted that “this esoteric critical mass of 
diversity of students” was a concept that “kept eluding him.”  Adam Liptak, College Diversity 
Nears its Last Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2011, at SR4. 
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tice O’Connor’s majority opinion in Grutter, it argues that a critical 
mass refers to the diversity of viewpoints and experiences within ra-
cial groups.  Such within-group diversity is related to the specific 
compelling interest in diversity articulated in Grutter:  the breakdown 
of racial stereotypes and promotion of cross-racial understanding.24 
A.  Rejecting Critical Mass as a Racial Quota or Numerical Goal 
Critics of the Grutter ruling have viewed the concept of critical 
mass solely in numerical terms.  For example, Professor Lino Graglia 
argues that “[i]t is difficult to see, in any event, how a ‘critical mass,’ 
some minimum number of a racial group, avoids being a quota by 
not being more specifically defined.”25  In his Grutter dissent, Justice 
Kennedy also stated that “critical mass is a delusion used by the Law 
School to mask its attempt to make race an automatic factor in most 
instances and to achieve numerical goals indistinguishable from quo-
tas.”26  Independent of the University of Michigan Law School’s prac-
tices, however, it is important to delineate the theoretical distinction 
between critical mass and numerical goals. 
The Grutter majority affirmed Bakke’s rejection of racial quotas;27 
thus, it could not have adopted a definition of “critical mass” based 
solely, or even primarily, on numbers or percentages of minority stu-
dents.  Justice O’Connor’s opinion noted that “[t]he Law School’s in-
terest is not simply ‘to assure within its student body some specified 
 
 24 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (“[T]he Law School’s admissions policy promotes ‘cross-racial un-
derstanding,’ helps to break down racial stereotypes, and ‘enables [students] to better 
understand persons of different races.’” (quoting Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 
246a, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241))).  But see id. at 389, (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he concept of critical mass is . . . used . . . to achieve numerical goals indistinguisha-
ble from quotas.”).  Justice Kennedy’s concern here underscores the need to clarify how 
critical mass is different from numerical goals. 
 25 Lino A. Graglia, Grutter and Gratz:  Race Preference to Increase Racial Representation Held “Pa-
tently Unconstitutional” Unless Done Subtly Enough in the Name of Pursuing “Diversity”, 78 TUL. 
L. REV. 2037, 2048 (2004).  See also Chief Justice Rehnquist’s view of critical mass, infra 
note 56 and accompanying text. 
 26 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  Justice Kennedy’s concern reflected the 
University of Michigan’s use of critical mass in practice, not an underlying concern with 
the theory of critical mass as entailing within-group diversity.  See id. at 389–90 (discussing 
how the University of Michigan School of Law’s admissions numbers from 1987–1998 
suggested that the school used numerical goals or racial quotas).  Parts IV and V infra, 
discuss how courts can review race-conscious admissions policies more stringently. 
 27 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (majority opinion) (“As Justice Powell made clear in Bakke, truly 
individualized consideration demands that race be used in a flexible, nonmechanical way.  
It follows from this mandate that universities cannot establish quotas for members of cer-
tain racial groups or put members of those groups on separate admissions tracks.” (inter-
nal citation omitted)). 
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percentage of a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic 
origin’ . . . [t]hat would amount to outright racial balancing, which is 
patently unconstitutional.”28  The Grutter majority did distinguish be-
tween a strict quota and a “permissible goal”;29 however, Justice Ken-
nedy’s dissent did not accept this subtle distinction,30 and it would 
likely not survive further review in Fisher.31  Considering these circum-
stances, one can posit that Grutter allows “some attention to num-
bers,”32 but there must be more to the definition of “critical mass” to 
distinguish it from numerical goals. 
B.  Critical Mass as a Counter to Tokenism:  An Important But Limited View 
During the trial phase of Grutter, the University of Michigan Law 
School contended that there is “no number, percentage, or range of 
numbers or percentages that constitute critical mass,”33 but it noted 
that critical mass entailed “numbers such that underrepresented mi-
nority students do not feel isolated or like spokespersons for their 
race.”34  Professor I. Bennett Capers contends that: 
 
 28 Id. at 329–30 (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (opinion 
of Powell, J.)). 
 29 Id. at 335 (“In contrast [to a quota], ‘a permissible goal . . . require[s] only a good-faith 
effort . . . to come within a range demarcated by the goal itself’. . . .” (quoting Sheet Metal 
Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 495 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring))). 
 30 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 391 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting the obvious tension between the 
pursuit of critical mass and the requirement of individual review in the University of 
Michigan Law School’s admissions policy and citing the Law School’s consultation of dai-
ly reports which indicated the composition of the incoming class along racial lines). 
 31 It is possible that the Court could rule solely on the issue of deference to universities and 
not address the meaning of “critical mass.”  Nevertheless, if the Court does consider the 
critical mass issue, Justice Kennedy’s Grutter dissent underscores his problems with the 
concept.  See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 32 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335–36 (majority opinion) (“The Law School’s goal of attaining a crit-
ical mass of underrepresented minority students does not transform its program into a 
quota.  As the Harvard plan described by Justice Powell recognized, there is of course 
‘some relationship between numbers and achieving the benefits to be derived from a di-
verse student body, and between numbers and providing a reasonable environment for 
those students admitted.’ ‘[S]ome attention to numbers,’ without more, does not trans-
form a flexible admissions system into a rigid quota.” (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 323)). 
 33 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318. 
 34 Id. at 319.  The Plaintiffs in Fisher also defined “critical mass” in similar terms.  See Fisher v. 
Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 243 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting that the Plaintiffs-Appellants con-
tend that “the concept of critical mass is defined by the minimum threshold for minority 
students to have their ideas represented in class discussions and not to feel isolated or like 
spokespersons for their race”); Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 6, Fisher, 631 F.3d 213 
(No. 09-50822) (arguing that “critical mass” is defined as “a sufficient number of un-
derrepresented minority students such that such minority students would ‘not feel isolat-
ed or like spokespersons for their race’”).  
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[C]ritical mass is not solely numerical.  Rather, a critical mass implies a 
climate where one is neither conspicuous nor on display, where one does 
not feel the opprobrium of being a token, nor the burden of being the 
designated representative for an entire group.  It also implies a climate 
where one can speak freely, where one not only has a voice, but a voice 
that will be heard.35 
It is very important for universities to acknowledge and address 
feelings of isolation and tokenism among minority students.  But for 
several reasons, this is not sufficient to define “critical mass” under 
Grutter.  First, “numbers such that underrepresented minority stu-
dents do not feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race”36 still 
implies that critical mass can be defined by numbers, even if these 
numbers may vary or constitute a range rather than a set numerical 
goal.  This runs very close to Justice Kennedy’s concern that “critical 
mass is a delusion used by the Law School . . . to achieve numerical 
goals indistinguishable from quotas.”37  Justice Sotomayor also raised 
this concern during the Fisher oral argument at the Supreme Court.38 
 
 35 I. Bennett Capers, Flags, 48 HOW. L.J. 121, 122–23 (2004).  Professor Capers presents a 
more nuanced view, focusing on the climate for minority students rather than on num-
bers.  At the Fisher oral argument, UT’s counsel adopted a similar definition, stating that 
“critical mass is an environment in which students of underrepresented . . . [minority 
groups] . . . [do not] . . . feel like spokespersons for their race.”  See Transcript of Oral 
Argument, supra note 1, at 46–47.  This Article agrees with Professor Capers’s point, but it 
contends that Grutter defined “critical mass” primarily in terms of the educational benefits 
of diversity.  It is these educational benefits that are the compelling interest in Grutter.  See 
infra Part II.C. 
 36 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 319. 
 37 Id. at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  Grutter did attempt to distinguish critical mass from 
racial quotas.  Id. at 335 (“In contrast [to a quota], ‘a permissible goal . . . require[s] only 
a good-faith effort . . . to come within a range demarcated by the goal itself’. . . . ” (quot-
ing Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 495 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring))).  However, Justice Kennedy did not accept this distinction.  Moreover, in the Grut-
ter oral argument, Justice Scalia asked counsel for the University of Michigan whether 
two, four, or eight percent constitutes a critical mass and followed up by stating, “You 
have to pick some number, don’t you?”  Transcript of Arguments in Grutter v. Bollinger, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2003, at 9, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/01/
politics/02TEXT1.html.  Counsel for the University of Michigan responded, “No, Your 
Honor, if it was a fixed range that said that it will be a minimum of 8 percent, come hell 
or high water, no matter what the qualifications of these applicants look like, no matter 
what it is that the majority applicants could contribute to the benefits of diversity, then 
certainly that would be a quota, but that is not what occurred here.  And in fact the testi-
mony was undisputed, that this was not intended to be a fixed goal.”  Id.  Nevertheless, 
this Article argues that numbers alone are not sufficient to understand or apply the criti-
cal mass concept.  From the perspective of this Article, asking what percentage constitutes 
a critical mass is insufficient because it does not take into account the within-group diver-
sity which is necessary to break down racial stereotypes and obtain the educational bene-
fits of diversity. 
 38 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 19 (Justice Sotomayor asking Plaintiffs’ 
counsel if “you have to set a quota for critical mass?”).  Plaintiffs’ counsel responded that 
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Second, studies suggest that minority students still do feel isolated 
and alienated on college campuses,39 so if this is the primary justifica-
tion for race-conscious admissions policies, then those policies may 
not be working.  This could raise questions about whether universities 
are actually fulfilling their compelling interest in diversity.40 
Finally, while alleviating feelings of isolation and tokenism is im-
portant to attaining the educational benefits of diversity, the Grutter 
majority opinion focused more directly on those educational bene-
fits.41  In order to attain the educational benefits of diversity, universi-
ties must aim to create campus environments where minority stu-
dents feel comfortable speaking and interacting with non-minority 
students.  But from the Grutter majority’s perspective, this is the 
means rather than the end, and it is not the defining feature of “criti-
cal mass.”42 
 
there is “a huge difference” between a quota and “having a range, a view as to what would 
be an appropriate level of comfort, critical mass . . .”  Id.  But Justice Sotomayor retorted, 
“[s]o we won’t call it a quota; we’ll call it a goal . . . it sounds awfully like a quota to me 
that Grutter said you should not be doing. . . .”  Id. 
 39 See, e.g., Deirdre M. Bowen, Brilliant Disguise:  An Empirical Analysis of a Social Experiment 
Banning Affirmative Action, 85 IND. L.J. 1197, 1233 (2010) (acknowledging “the power of 
creating critical mass and a diverse classroom” but noting that “stigma and racism . . . 
were still present”); Tara J. Yosso et al., Critical Race Theory, Racial Microaggressions, and 
Campus Racial Climate for Latina/o Undergraduates, 79 HARV. EDUC. REV. 659, 660 (2009) 
(examining the ways in which Latinas/os respond to racial microaggressions and con-
front hostile campus racial climates). 
 40 But see infra note 59 and accompanying text (noting that the University of Michigan Law 
School did not actually contend that it had enrolled a critical mass of minority students, 
but only that its admissions policy aimed toward that goal).  It is possible that the Law 
School never attained an actual critical mass, where minority students no longer felt iso-
lated.  This could well be a good argument to expand race-conscious policies to admit 
more minority students, but Justice Kennedy and the Supreme Court are very unlikely to 
do so in Fisher. 
 41 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 308 (“[T]he Law School defines its critical mass concept by reference 
to the substantial, important, and laudable educational benefits that diversity is designed 
to produce . . . .”).  See also Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 219 (5th Cir. 2011) (not-
ing that “critical mass” should be defined through “reference to the educational benefits 
that diversity is designed to produce”).  This Article contends that while the Fisher opin-
ion claimed that “critical mass” should be defined in terms of the educational benefits of 
diversity, its application of the concept did not reflect this, and its articulation of these 
educational benefits was incomplete.  See infra Parts III.B. and III.D.  But even the Fisher 
plaintiffs agree that “Grutter endorses an inward-facing concept of diversity that focuses on 
the functioning of the student body and the educational benefits that arise from admitting 
a ‘critical mass’ of underrepresented minority students . . . .”  Brief for the Plaintiffs-
Appellants at 33, Fisher, 631 F.3d 213 (No. 09-50822). 
 42 See infra Part I.C. 
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C.  The Grutter Majority’s Functional View of Critical Mass:  Educational 
Benefits of Within-Group Diversity 
The Grutter majority further defined “critical mass” in functional 
terms: 
[T]he Law School’s concept of critical mass is defined by reference to the 
educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce . . . . These 
benefits are substantial.  As the District Court emphasized, the Law 
School’s admissions policy promotes “cross-racial understanding,” helps 
to break down racial stereotypes, and “enables [students] to better un-
derstand persons of different races.”43 
Under this view, critical mass refers to a sufficiently diverse group 
of perspectives within each racial group to actualize the educational 
benefits of diversity.44  According to the Grutter majority, the goal of a 
race-conscious admissions policy should be to produce a critical mass 
with a “variety of viewpoints among minority students.”45  Such within-
group variation actualizes the educational benefits of diversity, as it 
serves to break down racial stereotypes:  “[W]hen a critical mass of 
underrepresented minority students is present, racial stereotypes lose 
their force because nonminority students learn there is no ‘minority 
viewpoint’ but rather a variety of viewpoints among minority stu-
dents.”46 
 
 43 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330. 
 44 See e.g., id. (“[Educational] benefits [of diversity] are substantial.  [T]he Law School’s 
admissions policy promotes ‘cross-racial understanding,’ helps to break down racial ste-
reotypes, and ‘enables [students] to better understand persons of different races.’ . . . 
These benefits are ‘important and laudable,’ because ‘classroom discussion is livelier, 
more spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting’ when the students have 
‘the greatest possible variety of backgrounds.’” (quoting Appendix to Petition for Certio-
rari at 246a, 244a, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241))). 
 45 Id. at 320. 
 46 Id. at 319–20.  See also id. at 333 (“The Law School does not premise its need for critical 
mass on ‘any belief that minority students always (or even consistently) express some 
characteristic minority viewpoint on any issue.’ . . . To the contrary, diminishing the force 
of such stereotypes is both a crucial part of the Law School’s mission, and one that it can-
not accomplish with only token numbers of minority students.” (quoting Brief for Re-
spondent Bollinger et al. at 30, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241))).  This language in 
Grutter speaks to the immediate, proximal impact of having a “critical mass.”  When eval-
uating critical mass in Fisher, the Fifth Circuit panel did not cite this language, instead de-
fining the educational benefits of diversity in much broader terms:  1. “Increased Per-
spectives”—those brought by diverse groups of students into the classroom, which add 
valuable knowledge and make for engaging classroom discussions; 2. “Professionalism”—
preparing students for “work and citizenship” by exposing them to diverse people and 
viewpoints; and 3. “Civic Engagement”—creating paths to leadership for individuals of 
every race and ethnicity.  See Fisher, 631 F.3d at 219–20 and infra notes 186 and 212–14 
and accompanying text. 
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Grutter’s language thus suggests that “meaningful representation”47 
is not just contingent upon numbers of minority students, but also 
includes sufficiently diverse experiences and perspectives within ra-
cial groups.48  This allows racial stereotypes to be broken down and 
facilitates the educational benefits of diversity, which are the constitu-
tional justification for race-conscious admissions policies in the first 
place.  When understood not only in terms of diverse representation 
of racial groups, but also different experiences and perspectives with-
in racial groups, the concept of a critical mass of minority students is 
directly related to the compelling interest articulated in Grutter.49 
1.  Why Critical Mass Cannot Be Defined by Minority Student Numbers 
This emphasis on within-group diversity also clarifies how critical 
mass is different from numerical goals or quotas.  By definition, di-
versity within racial groups cannot be attained merely by admitting 
particular numbers or percentages of students from each minority 
group, or even by monitoring the numbers of students admitted from 
such groups.50  Within-group diversity may involve “[s]ome attention 
 
 47 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318. 
 48 Of course, there cannot be sufficient within-group diversity if there are not adequate 
numbers of a particular minority group.  However, no particular number or percentage 
of a given racial group automatically guarantees that within-group diversity is present.  
That is an assessment that institutions must make themselves. 
 49 In a different context (voting rights), Justice Kennedy himself underscored the im-
portance of considering diversity within racial groups.  See League of United Latin Ameri-
can Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 434 (2006) (“We do a disservice to . . . important goals 
by failing to account for the differences between people of the same race.”).  But see Ed-
ward C. Thomas, Comment, Racial Classification and the Flawed Pursuit of Diversity:  How 
Phantom Minorities Threaten “Critical Mass” Justification in Higher Education, 2007 BYU L. 
REV. 813, 815–16 (arguing that “phantom minorities,” who take advantage of race-
conscious admissions policies even though they “look white, have Anglo names, and come 
from backgrounds void of racial-life experience” undermine the critical mass justification 
for affirmative action).  Justice Thomas’s point underscores the need for admissions 
committees to consider race in the context of an applicant’s entire profile, in conjunction 
with other factors, and to use individualized review to consider how each applicant con-
tributes to the educational benefits of diversity.  Regardless of whether this type of nu-
anced review is the current norm in university admissions, this Article argues that it is the 
standard that courts should enforce when evaluating universities’ race-conscious admis-
sions policies.  See infra Part IV. 
 50 This was another salient concern raised by Justice Kennedy.  See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 392 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The consultation of daily reports during the last stages in the 
admissions process suggests there was no further attempt at individual review save for 
race itself.  The admissions officers could use the reports to recalibrate the plus factor 
given to race depending on how close they were to achieving the Law School’s goal of 
critical mass.  The bonus factor of race would then become divorced from individual re-
view; it would be premised instead on the numerical objective set by the Law School.”). 
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to numbers,” 51 but universities must consider factors beyond race to 
attain a variety of viewpoints and experiences within various racial 
groups.52  This point is key to addressing Justice Kennedy’s concern 
about critical mass,53 because unlike the two views of critical mass pos-
ited earlier,54 within-group diversity cannot conceivably be defined by 
a number, percentage, or range of students from a minority group:  it 
cannot even be expressed in such terms, as some account of variation 
within that group is necessary.55  Moreover, Part II infra will illustrate 
how Grutter’s narrow tailoring principles make much more sense in 
light of this view of “critical mass.” 
2.  Why Critical Mass Can Vary for Different Minority Groups 
In his dissenting opinion in Grutter, the late Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, raised a 
more general question about critical mass:  why were different num-
bers of students admitted for different racial groups?  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist noted: 
[F]rom 1995 through 2000, the Law School admitted between 1,130 and 
1,310 students.  Of those, between 13 and 19 were Native American, be-
tween 91 and 108 were African-American, and between 47 and 56 were 
Hispanic.  If the Law School is admitting between 91 and 108 African-
Americans in order to achieve “critical mass,” thereby preventing African-
American students from feeling “isolated or like spokespersons for their 
race,” one would think that a number of the same order of magnitude 
would be necessary to accomplish the same purpose for Hispanics and 
Native Americans.  Similarly, even if all of the Native American applicants 
admitted in a given year matriculate, which the record demonstrates is 
not at all the case, how can this possibly constitute a “critical mass” of Na-
tive Americans in a class of over 350 students?  In order for this pattern of 
admission to be consistent with the Law School’s explanation of “critical 
mass,” one would have to believe that the objectives of “critical mass” of-
fered by respondents are achieved with only half the number of Hispan-
ics and one-sixth the number of Native Americans as compared to Afri-
 
 51 Id. at 336. 
 52 See infra Part II.C. 
 53 See supra notes 26 and 37 and accompanying text. 
 54 See supra Parts I.A and I.B. 
 55 A quota or numerical goal is obviously expressed as a number or percentage, and there 
are numbers and percentages (e.g., 50% or 75%) which would have to be sufficient for 
group members not to feel isolated—leading to the inquiry posed by Justice Scalia in the 
Grutter oral argument:  “You have to pick some number, don’t you?”  Transcript of Argu-
ments in Grutter v. Bollinger, supra note 37.  Within-group diversity, on the other hand, 
can never be determined by numbers or percentages.  To take an extreme example, even 
if 95% of the students in a class are members of a given group, the class might benefit 
from a member of that group who has very different viewpoints and experiences. 
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can-Americans.  But respondents offer no race-specific reasons for such 
disparities.  Instead, they simply emphasize the importance of achieving 
“critical mass,” without any explanation of why that concept is applied 
differently among the three underrepresented minority groups.56 
Professor Clark Cunningham echoes Chief Justice Rehnquist in 
lamenting the lack of response from other Justices to these critiques 
of the Law School’s admissions numbers.57  Both Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Professor Cunningham assume a numerical definition 
of critical mass, which the Grutter majority repudiated.58  Nevertheless, 
there are several possible responses to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s ques-
tion. 
First, in Grutter, the University of Michigan Law School did not ac-
tually contend that it had reached a critical mass of any minority 
group, but rather only that its race-conscious admissions policy 
“seeks” to attain this “goal.”59  It is possible that the number of Native 
 
 56 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 381 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
 57 Clark D. Cunningham, After Grutter Things Get Interesting!  The American Debate Over Affirm-
ative Action Is Finally Ready for Some Fresh Ideas From Abroad, 36 CONN. L. REV. 665, 670 
(2004) (“Although one wonders whether the Chief Justice actually would have voted to 
uphold the law school’s affirmative action program as long as it had admitted larger 
numbers of Hispanic and Native American applicants, the evidence he cited would seem 
to call for a response.  However, the majority opinion authored by Justice O’Connor did 
not really respond to either Justice Kennedy or Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concerns.”).  
Justice O’Connor did actually respond directly to Chief Justice Rehnquist in her Grutter 
opinion.  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336 (“The Chief Justice believes that the Law School’s policy 
conceals an attempt to achieve racial balancing, and cites admissions data to contend that 
the Law School discriminates among different groups within the critical mass. . . . But, as 
The Chief Justice concedes, the number of underrepresented minority students who ul-
timately enroll in the Law School differs substantially from their representation in the 
applicant pool and varies considerably for each group from year to year.”).  Justice 
O’Connor’s response suggests that critical mass can vary because it is not just about num-
bers of minority students, but about the diverse viewpoints and experiences within each 
minority group—a mix that varies substantially from year to year. 
 58 See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.  See also Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 
213, 219 (5th Cir. 2011) (“In his [Grutter] dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist saw critical 
mass as only the minimum level necessary ‘[t]o ensure that the[] minority students do 
not feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race; to provide adequate opportunities 
for the type of interaction upon which the educational benefits of diversity depend; and 
to challenge all students to think critically and reexamine stereotypes.’  On this view, crit-
ical mass is defined only as a proportion of the student body, and the percentage that suf-
fices for one minority group should also suffice for another group.  In contrast, Justice 
O’Connor, writing for the Court [in Grutter], explained that critical mass must be ‘de-
fined by reference to the educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce.’” 
(quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330, 380 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting))). 
 59 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329 (“As part of its goal of ‘assembling a class that is both excep-
tionally academically qualified and broadly diverse,’ the Law School seeks to ‘enroll a ‘crit-
ical mass’ of minority students.’” (quoting Brief for Respondent Bollinger at 13, Grutter, 
539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241)) (emphasis added)).  The University of Michigan Law School’s 
brief in Grutter also suggests that enrollment of a critical mass is a “hope” rather than an 
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Americans admitted was limited by the number of Native American 
applicants.  Moreover, even if there were more Native American ap-
plicants who could have been admitted, the University was limited by 
the finite consideration it could give to race in the admissions pro-
cess, lest race become too large of a factor and render the policy un-
constitutional.60  Justice Kennedy in particular emphasized that race 
should not be the “predominant factor” in admissions.61  Thus, the 
Law School could not have categorically admitted every Native Amer-
ican student without violating Grutter’s own narrow tailoring princi-
ples for race-conscious admissions policies.  Attaining a critical mass 
of a minority group was one of the University’s goals, but that goal 
had to be balanced with other priorities.62 
In that vein, not only is there a limited applicant pool, but there 
are also a limited number of spots in any admitted class.  An institu-
tion must make decisions about which perspectives are most im-
portant to achieving its desired educational benefits, and this can 
lead to different numbers of students admitted from various racial 
groups.  As part of its educational autonomy, an institution must also 
determine which of many diverse perspectives is most important in 
breaking down racial stereotypes and promoting the other educa-
tional benefits of diversity.63  For example, a university in Arizona or 
 
outcome it attains each year.  See Brief for Respondents at 13, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 
02-241), 2003 WL 402236 (“[T]he Law School hopes that its policy will enroll a ‘critical 
mass’ of minority students.” (emphasis added)). 
 60 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (“To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions pro-
gram cannot use a quota system—it cannot ‘insulat[e] each category of applicants with 
certain desired qualifications from competition with all other applicants.’  Instead, a uni-
versity may consider race or ethnicity only as a ‘“plus” in a particular applicant’s file,’ 
without ‘insulat[ing] the individual from comparison with all other candidates for the 
available seats.’” (quoting United States v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315, 317 (1978) (opinion 
of Powell, J., concurring.))).  
 61 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 392–93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“There is no constitutional objec-
tion to the goal of considering race as one modest factor among many others to achieve 
diversity, but an educational institution must ensure, through sufficient procedures, 
that . . . race does not become a predominant factor in the admissions decisionmaking.”).  
It should be noted that the plaintiff’s expert witness in Grutter conceded that “race is not 
the predominant factor in the Law School’s admissions calculus.”  Id. at 320. 
 62 See Brief for Respondents at 42–43, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) (“The Law School’s 
desire for a ‘critical mass’ of students from otherwise underrepresented minority groups 
is only one of many educational goals pursued through the admissions policy, and it is at 
all times weighed against other educational objectives.  Dean Lehman and the other trial 
witnesses testified unequivocally that the Law School would and does regularly reject 
qualified minority candidates, even if that risks falling short of a critical mass . . . .”). 
 63 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329 (“In announcing the principle of student body diversity as a com-
pelling state interest, Justice Powell invoked our cases recognizing a constitutional dimen-
sion, grounded in the First Amendment, of educational autonomy:  ‘The freedom of a 
 
482 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:2 
 
New Mexico may determine that more perspectives from Mexican 
Americans are necessary, given the large Mexican American popula-
tions in those states.  Similarly, an institution in South Dakota may 
choose to emphasize perspectives from Native Americans to a greater 
extent.  Local history and social and political dynamics determine 
both the prevalence of racial stereotypes in a given area, and the par-
ticular mix of perspectives necessary to help break down those stereo-
types and facilitate cross-racial understanding.  Even at elite universi-
ties with national student bodies, there is significant variation in local 
and institutional history and social dynamics.64 
Thus, universities are in the best position to determine the mix of 
students that constitutes a critical mass of diverse perspectives.65  Even 
if critical mass could be conceptualized solely in terms of numbers of 
minority students,66 a university cannot possibly admit a critical mass 
of every group.  There are too many different racial/ethnic groups 
with varying experiences and perspectives, all of which could con-
tribute to the educational benefits of diversity.  Moreover, enrollment 
of minority students may be limited by other factors, such as the 
availability of financial aid.67  Given limited resources and the limited 
 
university to make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student 
body.’ . . . From this premise, Justice Powell reasoned that by claiming ‘the right to select 
those students who will contribute the most to the “robust exchange of ideas,”’ a universi-
ty ‘seek[s] to achieve a goal that is of paramount importance in the fulfillment of its mis-
sion.’” (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312–13)). 
 64 For example, some Ivy League universities, such as Yale, Columbia, and the University of 
Pennsylvania, are located in urban communities that are predominantly African Ameri-
can, whereas others, such as Cornell and Dartmouth, are located in rural, predominantly 
White communities.  Moreover, institutional history can also play a significant role:  for 
example, the charter for Dartmouth aimed to create an institution “for the education and 
instruction of Youth of the Indian Tribes in this Land . . . and also of English Youth and 
any others.”  See About the Native American Program, DARTMOUTH COLLEGE, 
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~nap/about/ (last updated Mar. 26, 2012).  Since 1970, 
when then President John G. Kemeny of Dartmouth renewed the institution’s commit-
ment to Native Americans, “nearly 700 Native Americans from over 200 different tribes 
have attended Dartmouth, more than at all the other Ivy League institutions combined.”  
Id. 
 65 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 238 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[T]here is no reason to 
assume that critical mass will or should be the same for every racial group or every univer-
sity.”).  Alternatively, a university might also decide that racial stereotypes of a specific 
group—for example, African Americans—are particularly pervasive and pernicious on a 
broader level, and that the breakdown of those stereotypes is central to its educational 
mission.  Racial stereotypes are perpetuated by both local circumstances and the national 
media, and there is no prescription for how to best break them down. 
 66 See supra notes 27–29 (discussing why critical mass cannot be defined numerically). 
 67 See Osamudia R. James, Dog Wags Tail:  The Continuing Viability of Minority-Targeted Aid in 
Higher Education, 85 IND. L.J. 851, 853 (2010) (noting that “actually enrolling a critical 
mass of minority students [is] a goal that is often unattainable without financial aid”). 
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size of its admitted class, a university must make its own judgments 
about which perspectives should be included and are most central to 
its educational mission68—so long as any race-conscious admissions 
policies it employs adhere to Grutter’s guidelines.  In fact, this is the 
reason for Grutter’s deference to colleges and universities in the ad-
missions process.69 
Finally, in terms of minority students feeling “isolated or like 
spokespersons for their race,”70 Justice Rehnquist failed to consider 
that members of one minority group may help members of other mi-
nority groups feel less isolated.  For example, if there are African 
American and Latino students in a class who speak up and share their 
views, then a Native American student may feel more emboldened to 
do so.  In fact, minority student organizations regularly collaborate 
on activities and interact and support one another at many institu-
tions of higher education.71 
 
 68 See supra notes 64–65 (discussing various considerations a university might take into ac-
count when deciding what critical mass of minority students it should seek to admit). 
 69 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328–29 (2003) (“Our holding today is in keeping 
with our tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university’s academic decisions, 
within constitutionally prescribed limits. . . . ‘[G]ood faith’ on the part of a university is 
‘presumed’ absent ‘a showing to the contrary.’”). 
 70 Id. at 319. 
 71 For example, since 1978, undergraduate student of color organizations at the University 
of Pennsylvania have formed an umbrella group called the United Minorities Council, 
which sponsors events that promote unity among various minority groups.  See THE 
UNITED MINORITIES COUNCIL, http://unitedminoritiescouncil.org/ (last visited Oct. 2, 
2012).  Similarly, the University of Pennsylvania School of Law has a student group called 
the United Law Students of Color Council (“ULSCC”).  See https://www.law.upenn.edu/
cf/StudentOrganizations/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 19, 2012).  White students are also 
sometimes involved in these types of coalitions; for example, at the University of Pennsyl-
vania, there is also a Black-Jewish student coalition called Alliance and Understanding.  
See THE GREENFIELD INTERCULTURAL CENTER, Alliance and Understanding, 
http://www.vpul.upenn.edu/gic/au.php (last visited Oct. 2, 2012).  Additionally, at the 
New York University School of Law, the various student of color organizations—the Black 
Allied Law Students Association (“BALSA”), Latino Law Students Association (“LLSA”), 
Asian Pacific American Law Students Association (“APALSA”), South Asian Law Students 
Association (“SALSA”), and the Multiracial Law Students Association (“MuLSA”)—held 
an “All-ALSA” Symposium in 2008 entitled “Can People of Color Become a United Coali-
tion?”  See Vinay Harpalani, Ambiguity, Ambivalence, and Awakening:  A South Asian Becoming 
“Critically” Aware of Race in America, 11 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 71, 82 (2009).  
These organizations have also formed an “All-ALSA” Coalition and regularly meet and 
collaborate on events.  See, e.g., All ALSA Coalition Graduation and Reception, 
http://its.law.nyu.edu/eventcalendar/index.cfm?fuseaction=main.detail&id=18723 (last 
visited Oct. 2, 2012).  Also, the Black, Latino, Asian Pacific Law Alumni Association 
(“BLAPA”) serves the same purpose for alumni of NYU School of Law.  See BLACK, 
LATINO, ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICAN LAW ASSOCIATION, http://www.law.nyu.edu/
alumni/alumniassociations/blapa/index.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2012). 
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3.  Can Critical Mass Be Measured at All? 
It is important to note that while Grutter allows “‘[s]ome attention 
to numbers,’”72 this Article argues that critical mass is not readily 
measurable in practice.  As noted, attaining a critical mass requires an 
admissions committee to look to other factors beyond race,73 so mere 
numbers or percentages of minority students would not allow one to 
determine if a critical mass is present.  Based on the interaction of 
various demographic characteristics and life experiences (including 
those involving race), Grutter envisioned that a given student may ex-
press one or more perspectives or characteristics that add to the mix 
of ideas in an admitted class.74  The student’s unique contribution in 
this milieu depends in part on the other perspectives represented in 
the applicant pool; thus, it is not possible to accurately predict ex 
ante how many students of a given group are necessary to meet the 
goals of attaining the educational benefits of diversity.  Moreover, 
these benefits may vary based on local history, demographics, and 
politics, or the institution’s history and educational mission, all of 
which can also change over time.  Thus, critical mass may vary by in-
stitution and may vary over time with local and national demographic 
changes.  As noted, it may also be different for different racial 
groups.75 
Because of these complexities, it would be difficult to devise a 
consistent judicial standard to determine whether an institution has 
attained a “critical mass.”76  In theory, one might devise an index of 
 
 72 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336. 
 73 Id. at 337 (“[T]he Law School engages in a highly individualized, holistic review of each 
applicant’s file, giving serious consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute 
to a diverse educational environment.”). 
 74 Id. at 309 (“The Law School’s admissions program . . . is flexible enough to ensure that 
each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes race or ethnicity 
the defining feature of the application. . . . The Law School engages in a highly individu-
alized, holistic review of each applicant’s file, giving serious consideration to all the ways 
an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment.  There is no policy, 
either de jure or de facto, of automatic acceptance or rejection based on any single “soft” 
variable. . . . [T]he program adequately ensures that all factors that may contribute to di-
versity are meaningfully considered alongside race.”). 
 75 See supra Part I.C.2; Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 238 (5th Cir. 2011)  (“[T]he ed-
ucational benefits recognized in Grutter go beyond the narrow ‘pedagogical concept’ 
urged by Appellants.  On this understanding, there is no reason to assume that critical 
mass will or should be the same for every racial group or every university.”). 
 76 When Fisher was appealed to the Fifth Circuit, the amicus brief of the Mountain States 
Legal Foundation made a similar claim.  See Brief for Mountain States Legal Foundation 
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 14, Fisher, 631 F.3d 213 (No. 09-50822) 
(“[B]ecause critical mass cannot be quantified, no court is able to determine whether a 
critical mass of minority students is present or lacking.”).  
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various types of diversity—socioeconomic, geographic, experiential, 
political, etc.—and aim to measure diversity within racial groups, in 
addition to the numbers of students from each racial group.  In prac-
tice, however, this would be a difficult and subjective enterprise for a 
court to undertake; it is best left to university admissions committees 
who can assess these factors and local conditions more effectively.77  
This is why Grutter entrusts colleges and university admissions com-
mittees to employ “good faith” when using race as a factor in the ad-
missions process.78 
Because critical mass cannot be readily measured, this Article ar-
gues that it is merely part of the definition of Grutter’s compelling in-
terest, not part of the narrow tailoring test for race-conscious admis-
sions policies.79  This does not mean, however, that there is no room 
for more stringent judicial review of race-conscious admissions poli-
cies in Fisher v. Texas, as Parts IV and V will show. 
II.  WITHIN-GROUP DIVERSITY, NARROW TAILORING, AND DEFERENCE:  
REDUCING STIGMATIC HARM 
Grutter stands in contrast with much of the Supreme Court’s re-
cent race and affirmative action jurisprudence.  In the two decades 
preceding Grutter, the Court was much more apt to strike down race-
 
 77 However, at the Fisher Supreme Court oral argument, counsel for the United States as 
amicus curiae in support of UT did contend that courts could determine whether a criti-
cal mass is present at a university.  When asked by Chief Justice Roberts how to tell when a 
university has attained a critical mass, counsel for the United States answered:   
I think the Court . . . has to make its own independent judgment . . . [by] 
look[ing] at the kind of information that the university considered . . . [t]hat 
could be information about the composition of the class . . . classroom diversi-
ty . . . . retention and graduation rates . . . the university’s context in history . . . 
[a]nd then what the Court’s got to do is satisfy itself that the University . . . needs 
to consider race to further advance the educational goals that Grutter has identi-
fied as a compelling interest.   
  Transcript of Oral Argument supra note 1, at 69–70. 
 78 Cf. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 309–10. (“The Court takes the Law School at its word that it would 
like nothing better than to find a race-neutral admissions formula and will terminate its 
use of racial preferences as soon as practicable.”). 
 79 UT contended that the Fisher Plaintiffs framed critical mass as part of both the compelling 
interest and narrow tailoring prongs of strict scrutiny:   
Plaintiffs contend that UT’s revised admissions policy is not narrowly tailored be-
cause . . . it was not needed for UT to enroll a critical mass of underrepresented 
minorities.  (At times, Plaintiffs refer to this as a “compelling interest” argument, 
and at other times they characterize it as a “narrow tailoring” argument.  But the 
argument is meritless regardless of nomenclature.)   
           Brief of Appellees at 43, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-
50822).  The argument for resolving Fisher posed by this Article is not contingent upon 
whether critical mass is considered part of the compelling interest or narrow tailoring 
prong.  See infra Parts IV and V. 
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conscious policies.80  Since 2003, the Court has narrowed the scope of 
Grutter to higher education.81  The Court’s deviation in Grutter has 
largely been attributed to the unique educational benefits of student 
diversity at colleges and universities.82 
However, another factor that distinguished Grutter from other af-
firmative action cases was the flexible, unquantified manner in which 
the University of Michigan Law School used race in the context of its 
holistic admissions policy.  Justice O’Connor’s Grutter opinion laid 
out several criteria for narrowly tailored, race-conscious, holistic ad-
missions policies:  individualized consideration of all applicants, flex-
ible, non-mechanical use of race, no insulation from competition 
based on race, no undue harm or burden to non-minority applicants, 
 
 80 Justice O’Connor herself had authored numerous opinions which invalidated race-
conscious policies under the Equal Protection Clause.  See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 
630, 657 (1993) (striking down North Carolina’s congressional redistricting plan because 
“[r]acial classifications . . . pose the risk of lasting harm to our society. . . . [because] 
[t]hey reinforce the belief . . . that individuals should be judged by the color of their 
skin. . . . Racial gerrymandering . . . may balkanize us into competing racial factions”); 
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (striking down the city of 
Richmond’s minority set-aside program for contracts); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 
476 U.S. 267, 284 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (striking down the “layoff provision” 
which preserved jobs of minority teachers with less seniority).  Even in the few cases 
where the Court upheld race-conscious policies, Justice O’Connor had dissented.  See 
Metro Broad., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dis-
senting) (upholding race-conscious policies implemented by Federal Communications 
Commission); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(upholding “one-black-for-one-white promotion requirement”). 
 81 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 765 (2007) 
(striking down race-conscious public school assignment plans in Seattle and Louisville 
and noting that in Grutter, the Court’s “deference [in the use of race] was prompted by 
factors uniquely relevant to higher education”). 
 82 See Kenneth L. Karst, The Revival of Forward-Looking Affirmative Action, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 
60, 60 (2004) (noting that “[i]n Grutter, the Court spelled out in some detail the potential 
educational advantages of student diversity . . . thus . . . grounding in social science . . . 
the advantages Justice Powell had asserted [in Bakke] on the basis of less evidence”).  
Karst also highlighted the role of three amicus briefs—one from military leaders, another 
from business leaders, and a third from organized labor—in facilitating the Court’s ac-
ceptance of diversity in education as a compelling state interest.  Id. at 66–69.  See also 
Marcia G. Synnott, The Evolving Diversity Rationale in University Admissions:  From Regents v. 
Bakke to the University Of Michigan Cases, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 463, 493 (2005) (“Justice 
O’Connor’s majority opinion recognized that race may also be used in an inclusive way to 
achieve diversity that is beneficial to white and minority students alike.”); Colin S. Diver, 
From Equality to Diversity:  The Detour from Brown to Grutter, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 699 
(2004) (“In her opinion for the Grutter majority, Justice O’Connor variably characterizes 
the state’s interests as:  ‘obtaining “the educational benefits that flow from a diverse stu-
dent body”’; “‘attaining a diverse student body’; and ‘assembling a class that is both ex-
ceptionally academically qualified and broadly diverse.’”). 
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and “sunset” provisions to eventually end race-conscious policies.83  
While many commentators have criticized its treatment of narrow tai-
loring as a deviation from the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence,84 this 
Part explains Grutter’s narrow tailoring principles in terms of mini-
mizing the stigmatic harm of race-conscious admissions policies—a 
goal that is consistent with the Court’s recent race jurisprudence.  
Additionally, this Part illustrates how Grutter’s narrow tailoring prin-
ciples are related to the critical mass concept and particularly to di-
versity within racial groups—thus providing internal logic and coher-
ence to the much-maligned Grutter majority opinion.85 
A.  Overview of Stigmatic Harm 
To explain Grutter’s theory of narrow tailoring, it is first necessary 
to define “stigmatic harm.”  In the Supreme Court’s recent race ju-
risprudence, stigmatic harm can be understood as the harm that oc-
curs when a government policy reinforces racial stereotypes.  For ex-
ample, Justice O’Connor, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 
describes this harm:   
Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm. . . . [T[hey 
may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of 
racial hostility. . . . [R]einforc[ing] common stereotypes holding that cer-
tain groups are unable to achieve success without special protection 
based on a factor having no relation to individual worth.86   
The harm espoused here is a constitutional harm, not a tangible 
or psychological one.87  Some commentators have embraced the view 
 
 83 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334, 341–42 (2003) (describing the features of a narrowly tailored 
race-conscious admissions policy). 
 84 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don’t Tell, Don’t Ask:  Narrow Tailoring After Grutter and 
Gratz, 85 TEX. L. REV. 517, 519 (2007) (arguing that Grutter deviates from the traditional 
“least restrictive means” test of narrow tailoring); David Crump, The Narrow Tailoring Issue 
in the Affirmative Action Cases:  Reconsidering the Supreme Court’s Approval in Gratz and Grut-
ter of Race-Based Decision-Making by Individualized Discretion, 56 FLA. L. REV. 483, 538 (2004) 
(arguing that in Gratz and Grutter, “the Court performed poorly in defining narrow tailor-
ing.  The majority spent most of its effort explaining what narrow tailoring is not, and lit-
tle in defining what it is”). 
 85 See supra note 11. 
 86 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–94 (1989). 
 87 This notion of stigmatic harm is very similar to the definition of “expressive harm” articu-
lated by Richard H. Pildes and Richard G. Niemi:   
An expressive harm is one that results from the ideas or attitudes expressed 
through a governmental action, rather than from the more tangible or material 
consequences the action brings about.  On this view, the meaning of a governmen-
tal action is just as important as what that action does.  Public policies can violate 
the Constitution not only because they bring about concrete costs, but because the 
very meaning they convey demonstrates inappropriate respect for relevant public 
values. 
 
488 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:2 
 
that race-conscious policies directly stigmatize and inflict psychologi-
cal harms upon minorities, and this is a debated issue.88  However, the 
presence or absence of any such psychological harms or other tangi-
ble effects is not the relevant issue.  The Court’s recent race jurispru-
dence describes constitutional stigmatic harm as that which occurs 
when government action itself reinforces racial stereotypes; the tan-
gible results of such action are not relevant to the constitutional anal-
ysis.  As Justice O’Connor noted in her dissenting opinion in Metro 
Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, “Social scien-
tists may debate how peoples’ thoughts and behavior reflect their 
background, but the Constitution provides that the Government may 
not allocate benefits and burdens among individuals based on the as-
sumption that race or ethnicity determines how they act or think.”89 
 
  Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and Voting 
Rights:  Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 
506–07 (1993).  Professors Pildes and Niemi further note that the “harm is not concrete 
to particular individuals,” but rather “lies in the disruption to constitutionally underwrit-
ten public understandings about the appropriate structure of values.”  Id. at 507. 
 88 See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 373 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“The majority of blacks are admitted to the Law School because of discrimination, and 
because of this policy all are tarred as undeserving.  This problem of stigma does not de-
pend on determinacy as to whether those stigmatized are actually the ‘beneficiaries’ of 
racial discrimination.  When blacks take positions in the highest places of government, 
industry, or academia, it is an open question today whether their skin color played a part 
in their advancement.  The question itself is the stigma—because either racial discrimina-
tion did play a role, in which case the person may be deemed ‘otherwise unqualified,’ or 
it did not, in which case asking the question itself unfairly marks those blacks who would 
succeed without discrimination.”); Clegg, supra note 11, at 435 (contending that race-
conscious admissions policies “stigmatize the so-called beneficiaries in the eyes of their 
classmates, teachers, and themselves . . .”); Richard H. Sander, The Racial Paradox of the 
Corporate Law Firm, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1755, 1812 (2006) (arguing that partners in law firms 
have low expectations of black associates); Joshua M. Levine, Comment, Stigma’s Opening:  
Grutter’s Diversity Interest(s) and the New Calculus for Affirmative Action in Higher Education, 
94 CAL. L. REV. 457, 487 (2006) (referring to Justice Clarence Thomas as “a black person 
who has felt stigmatic harm from others questioning his competency and pressuring him 
to conform to racial stereotypes”).  But see Angela Onwuachi-Willig et al., Cracking the Egg:  
Which Came First—Stigma or Affirmative Action?, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1346 (2008) (arguing 
that “affirmative action policies do not in fact ‘harm’ students of color in the way that op-
ponents of affirmative action have claimed”). 
 89 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  Also, in Shaw v. Reno, Justice 
O’Connor’s majority opinion noted that “‘an explicit policy of assignment by race may 
serve to stimulate our society’s latent race consciousness, suggesting the utility and pro-
priety of basing decisions on a factor that ideally bears no relationship to an individual’s 
worth or needs.’” 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993) (quoting United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburg, 
Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 173 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part)).  Professors Pil-
des and Niemi argue that Shaw is rooted in the notion that “the state has impermissibly 
endorsed too dominant a role for race,” and that the decision “might rest on the intrinsic 
ground that the endorsement is wrong, in and of itself,” or “on the instrumental ground 
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Thus, stigmatic harm as conceptualized in the Court’s jurispru-
dence occurs when a government policy treats individuals in the same 
manner based on racial group membership, regardless of the nega-
tive or positive consequences for minorities (or for non-minorities).90 
B.  Grutter’s Theory of Narrow Tailoring 
Having defined stigmatic harm, this Part now illustrates how Grut-
ter’s narrow tailoring principles aim to minimize the stigmatic harm 
of its race-conscious policies. 
1.  The Gratz/Grutter Distinction 
At the same time it upheld the Law School’s admissions policy in 
Grutter, the Court struck down the University of Michigan’s race-
conscious admissions policy for the College of Letters, Sciences, and 
Arts (“LSA”) in Gratz v. Bollinger.91  The Gratz plan relied on a fixed 
weight point system rather than a flexible, holistic admissions pro-
cess; LSA’s admissions policy automatically awarded twenty points on 
a 150-point scale to applicants from underrepresented minority 
groups,92 a measure the Court found to be too rigid and mechani-
cal—failing to “provide . . . individualized consideration.”93 
Various scholars have critiqued the Court’s distinction between 
Gratz and Grutter.94  Professor Cass Sunstein contends that:   
[I]n the context of affirmative action, Justice O’Connor’s interest in case-
by-case judgment has led her to a puzzling and probably indefensible 
 
that this state endorsement threatens to reshape social perceptions along similar lines.”  
Pildes and Niemi, supra note 87, at 509. 
 90 For an alternative view of racial stigmatic harms, see R. A. Lenhardt, Understanding the 
Mark:  Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 803 (2004) (arguing 
“that stigmatic harm occurs when a given act or policy sends the message that racial dif-
ference renders a person or a group inferior to Whites, the category constructed as the 
racial norm”).  This Article does not question the validity of Professor Lenhardt’s propo-
sition; it merely contends that the Supreme Court has a different view of stigmatic harm, 
as apparent in its race jurisprudence, including Grutter.  See supra Part II.A. 
 91 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275–76 (2009). 
 92 Id. at 255. 
 93 Id. at 271. 
 94 See, e.g., Ayres & Foster, supra note 84; Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Minimalism, 58 STAN. 
L. REV. 1899, 1902 (2006); Crump, supra note 84, at 528–29 (“One can argue that the un-
dergraduate Michigan program at issue in Gratz, involving a fixed-point system, should 
have been regarded as constitutionally superior to the unlimited discretion model in 
Grutter . . . . At least in such a system the invidious exercise of discretion has been struc-
tured, confined, and checked . . . . The point system used in the undergraduate program 
struck down in Gratz should instead have been preferred because it makes the racial rem-
edy visible . . . .”). 
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conclusion.  It is hardly clear that the Constitution should be taken to re-
quire a procedure that sacrifices transparency, predictability, and equal 
treatment—and that does so while imposing significant burdens on offi-
cials who must evaluate particular applications for admission.95   
Professor Sunstein attributes Justice O’Connor’s Grutter decision to 
her general “holistic practice,”96 shown through judicial minimalism 
and a “preference for case-by-case judgment.”97  Professor Heather 
Gerkin espouses a different view, emphasizing stealth as value em-
braced in the Grutter approach to race-conscious admissions.98 
While these are valid perspectives, another explanation for the 
Gratz-Grutter distinction can be found in the Court’s attempt to mini-
mize the stigmatic harm of race preferences.99  In Gratz, the majority 
noted that the “LSA policy does not provide . . . individualized con-
sideration . . . [because it] . . . auto-matically distributes 20 points to 
every single applicant from an ‘underrepresented minority’ group, as 
defined by the University.”100  In contrast to the LSA policy struck 
down in Gratz, the Law School admissions policy upheld in Grutter did 
not use a point system; rather, it considered race subjectively as one 
element of a holistic admissions process.101  Minority applicants did 
not all receive the same benefit and race was considered along with 
 
 95 Sunstein, supra note 94, at 1902. 
 96 Id. at 1901. 
 97 Id. 
 98 See Gerken, supra note 6, at 104 (characterizing Justices Powell and O’Connor’s views as 
“something akin to a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ approach to race-conscious decisionmaking:  
use race, but don’t be obvious about it” (internal citation omitted)). 
 99 See Michelle Adams, Searching for Strict Scrutiny in Grutter v. Bollinger, 78 TUL. L. REV. 
1941, 1953 (2004) (arguing that in Grutter, “the Court was more concerned with how the 
Law School’s application process actually appeared and the message that it sent to the 
public than with its impact on any particular white applicant.  In this way, Justice 
O’Connor’s acceptance of the Law School’s application process in Grutter is consistent 
with her rejection of the bizarrely shaped electoral districts in Shaw v. Reno. . . . In Grutter, 
as in Shaw, the message communicated by the governmental action was paramount”).  
Joshua Levine also notes that Grutter’s narrow tailoring principles may reduce stigmatic 
harm.  See Levine, supra note 88, at 520 (“[I]f race truly is ‘one of many’ factors and acts 
only as a small ‘plus’—such that the applicant and others can never really know whether 
race played a role in one’s admission, then it is possible the stigmatic harm would be re-
duced.”).  However, Levine’s definition of “stigmatic harm” is broader than the one 
posed in this Article, as it encompasses tangible harm to minority applicants.  See supra 
Part II.B. 
100 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271 (2003). 
101 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337 (2003).  (“[T]he Law School engages in a highly 
individualized, holistic review of each applicant’s file, giving serious consideration to all 
the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment. . . . Unlike 
the program at issue in Gratz v. Bollinger . . . the Law School awards no mechanical, prede-
termined diversity ‘bonuses’ based on race or ethnicity.” (internal citations omitted)). 
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other factors to determine its place in the overall evaluation.102  Grut-
ter’s requirements for a narrowly tailored, holistic admissions pro-
gram—individualized review, flexible use of race, consideration of 
factors other than race, preference for race-neutral alternatives, and 
“sunset” provisions to gradually phase out race-conscious policies—all 
reflect a principle of minimizing stigmatic harm.  Grutter held that 
“truly individualized consideration demands that race be used in a 
flexible, nonmechanical way.”103  The decision contemplates that race 
will be considered as a “plus” factor only in the context of a given ap-
plicant’s other characteristics,104 and individualized review of all ap-
plicants is required to determine if and how race should serve as a 
“plus factor.”105  These provisions serve to minimize stigmatic harm by 
ensuring that beyond the holistic, individually variable consideration 
of race, minority students are not treated differently than non-
minority students.106  Grutter also requires colleges and universities to 
undertake “good faith” consideration of race-neutral alternatives to 
the race-conscious admissions policy,107 and to periodically review the 
 
102 Id. at 336–37.  (“When using race as a ‘plus’ factor in university admissions, a university’s 
admissions program must remain flexible enough to ensure that each applicant is evalu-
ated as an individual and not in a way that makes an applicant’s race or ethnicity the de-
fining feature of his or her application.  The importance of this individualized considera-
tion in the context of a race-conscious admissions program is paramount.”)  See Univ. of 
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 n.52 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (identifying the “de-
nial . . . of th[e] right to individualized consideration” as the “principal evil” of the medi-
cal school’s admissions program). 
103 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 334. 
104 Id. at 337 (“[T]he Law School’s race-conscious admissions program adequately ensures 
that all factors that may contribute to student body diversity are meaningfully considered 
alongside race in admissions decisions.”). 
105 Id. at 334 (“Universities can . . . consider race or ethnicity more flexibly as a ‘plus’ factor 
in the context of individualized consideration of each and every applicant.”). 
106 Cf. Paul J. Mishkin, The Uses of Ambivalence:  Reflections on the Supreme Court and the Constitu-
tionality of Affirmative Action, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 928 (1983) (“The indirectness of the 
less explicitly numerical systems may have significant advantages, not so much in terms of 
the processes of consideration as in the felt impact of their operation over time.  The de-
scription of race as simply ‘another factor’ among a lot of others considered in seeking 
diversity tends to minimize the sense that minority students are separate and different 
and the recipients of special dispensations; the use of more explicitly separate and struc-
tured systems might have the opposite effect.).  Professor Mishkin focused here on ad-
vantages of the perception that race is used in a flexible, individualized manner.  In con-
trast, this Article focuses on advantages of actually using race in such a manner. 
107 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339 (“Narrow tailoring does . . . require serious, good faith considera-
tion of workable race-neutral alternatives that will achieve the diversity the university 
seeks.”). 
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policy to determine if it is still necessary.108  Here, Grutter recognized 
that any preferential treatment based on race creates stigmatic harm 
and should be phased out eventually.109 
In these ways, Grutter’s mandate that “[t]he importance of this in-
dividualized consideration in the context of a race-conscious admis-
sions program is paramount”110 was consistent with the view in Croson 
and Shaw that “individual worth” should predominate over race.111  
While the cases differ in that the former upheld a race-conscious pol-
icy and the latter two did not, all of them reflect a broader principle 
of avoiding or minimizing stigmatic harm. 
Scholarly analysis has generally not examined this aspect of Grut-
ter112—probably because Grutter did not strike down a race-conscious 
policy, and because some commentators view Grutter’s narrow tailor-
ing provisions as a smokescreen that merely hides racial quotas,113 or 
at least serves mainly to hide the use of race rather than to ensure 
that race is actually used in a flexible, individualized manner.114  Part 
IV will discuss how courts can review race-conscious policies more 
stringently under Grutter. 
2.  Least Restrictive Means as the “Least Stigmatic Means” 
Professors Ian Ayres and Sydney Foster provide another critique 
of Grutter’s narrow tailoring requirements.  They argue that the Grut-
ter ruling deviated from prior constitutional doctrine requiring gov-
ernment use of suspect classifications to employ the “least restrictive 
 
108 Id. at 342 (“In the context of higher education, the durational requirement can be met by 
sunset provisions in race-conscious admissions policies and periodic reviews to determine 
whether racial preferences are still necessary to achieve student body diversity.”). 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 337. 
111 See supra notes 86 and 89, and accompanying text. 
112 But see Levine, supra note 88, at 520 (noting how Grutter’s narrow tailoring principles may 
reduce the stigma associated with race-conscious policies); Adams, supra note 99, at 1953 
(noting that “[i]nGrutter [. . .] the message communicated by the governmental action 
was paramount”). 
113 See, e.g., Graglia, supra note 25, at 2048.  In his Grutter dissent, Justice Kennedy expresses a 
similar view.  See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[T]he concept of crit-
ical mass is a delusion used by the Law School to mask its attempt to make race an auto-
matic factor in most instances and to achieve numerical goals indistinguishable from quo-
tas.”).  This Article only aims to articulate the theory underlying Grutter and to apply this 
theory to Fisher v. University of Texas.  The Article takes no position on whether the Uni-
versity of Michigan Law School’s admissions policy actually adhered to this theory based 
on the facts in Grutter. 
114 See supra notes 98 and 106, and accompanying text. 
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[means].”115  In their view, narrow tailoring of race-conscious admis-
sions policies should require the “minimum necessary preference” to 
achieve sufficient diversity.116  Part V will discuss these issues further. 
Professor Ayres and Foster also contend that the Grutter admis-
sions plan gave more weight to race than the plan struck down in 
Gratz,117 and thus did not employ the “minimum necessary prefer-
ence.”118  Assuming that Professor Ayres and Foster are correct in 
their assessment of weight given to race, one can posit that under 
Grutter, stigmatic harm is not determined solely by the weight of race 
preferences (although that is a factor),119 but also by the manner in 
which those preferences are applied.  A flexible, holistic admissions 
process with individualized review creates less stigmatic harm than a 
fixed-weight point system, even if the latter gives less overall weight to 
race, because flexibility and individualized review ensure—to the 
greatest extent possible—that all applicants from a given group will 
not be treated exactly the same merely because of their race.120  Pro-
 
115 Ayres & Foster, supra note 84, at 523 n.28 (citing Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 
(1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part) (noting that state action which employs “‘suspect classifications’ is 
to be subjected to ‘strict scrutiny’ and can be justified only if it furthers a compelling gov-
ernment purpose and, even then, only if no less restrictive alternative is available”).  Ayres 
and Foster concede that “[s]ome older cases include language suggesting that strict scru-
tiny does not demand use of the least restrictive means[,]” but they contend that “[i]n 
light of more recent cases demanding consideration of race-neutral alternatives and ap-
plying a stricter version of strict scrutiny, however, these cases are no longer good law 
with respect to this point.”  Id.  Nevertheless, for a different view of narrow tailoring, see 
Jeb Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 438 (1997) (noting that strict scrutiny 
in recent equal protection jurisprudence can be viewed as “a cost-benefit justificatory 
test . . . [which] would serve to determine whether a law that causes acknowledged consti-
tutional harms is justified by sufficiently important benefits that a less constitutionally 
costly . . . law could not have achieved”). 
116 Ayres & Foster, supra note 84, at 521. 
117 Id. at 534 (concluding that “the Law School placed more weight on race than the Col-
lege”).  See also infra Part V.B.2 (discussing weight given to race in admissions as a limiting 
principle for race-conscious admissions policies). 
118 See Ayres & Foster, supra note 84, at 521. 
119 This Article builds on Professors Pildes and Niemi’s analysis of stigmatic harm by arguing 
that the stigmatic harm associated with government use of race accrues not only when 
race has too dominant a role, but also when it is used in a manner that promotes stereo-
typing by treating all of individuals of the same race in exactly the same way (e.g., by us-
ing a mechanical point system such as the one struck down in Gratz).  Grutter essentially 
prioritizes the latter concern over the former.  See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 87 and ac-
companying text. 
120 As noted earlier, some commentators, including Justice Kennedy, claim that Grutter’s nar-
row tailoring principles allow universities to hide their use of quotas and point systems 
under the guise of holistic admissions.  See supra notes 25 and 113, and accompanying 
text.  To the extent this is true, courts must be more vigilant in enforcing Grutter’s narrow 
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fessor Ayres and Foster do acknowledge that narrow tailoring inquiry 
can vary by context,121 and in this context, the Grutter majority created 
a least stigmatic means principle—a standard that defines narrow tailor-
ing in terms of minimizing the stigmatic harm of race-conscious ad-
missions policies.122 
C.  Within-Group Diversity and Grutter’s Internal Logic 
Critical mass and Grutter’s narrow tailoring principles are essential-
ly two sides of the same coin, and considering them together shows 
the internal logic and coherence of the Grutter opinion.  A critical 
mass of minority students, which includes sufficient diversity of view-
points and experiences within each racial group, facilitates the educa-
tional benefits of diversity that Grutter held as a compelling interest:  
breaking down racial stereotypes and promoting cross-racial under-
standing and dialogue.123  Grutter recognized that these benefits are 
tangible and important, and that race-conscious admissions policies 
are necessary to attain them. 
At the same time, however, Grutter recognized the stigmatic harm 
of using race-conscious admissions policies and how they could rein-
force the very stereotypes that a critical mass of viewpoints and expe-
riences was intended to break down.  Thus, Grutter’s narrow tailoring 
principles aim to reduce stereotyping within the admissions process 
by minimizing stigmatic harm and requiring that applicants be re-
viewed on an individual basis.  This is why Grutter mandates that race 
be used in a flexible, rather than a mechanical, manner.  Even 
though race-conscious policies can be employed, it is paramount that 
they not treat all applicants of the same racial group in exactly the 
same manner.124  Grutter’s other narrow tailoring requirements, in-
 
tailoring principles, and emphasizing within-group diversity aids in this process.  See infra 
Parts II.C. and IV. 
121 Ayres & Foster, supra note 84, at 519 (“[T]he narrow tailoring requirement has always had 
multiple dimensions.”).  See also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333–34 (2003) 
(“[T]he contours of the narrow-tailoring inquiry with respect to race-conscious university 
admissions programs . . . must be calibrated to fit the distinct issues raised by the use of 
race to achieve student body diversity in public higher education.”).  Ayres and Foster 
themselves acknowledge that the “narrow tailoring requirement has always had multiple 
dimensions[.]”  Ayres & Foster, supra note 84, at 519. 
122 Part IV.C.2., infra, reconciles the least restrictive means and least stigmatic means theories 
of narrow tailoring. 
123 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330. 
124 See supra Part II.B. 
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cluding its “sunset” requirement,125 also aim to reduce and eventually 
eliminate stigmatic harm. 
When viewed together, critical mass and the least stigmatic means 
principle of narrow tailoring represent Grutter’s balance between the 
educational benefits of diversity and the stigmatic harm of race-
conscious policies.126  In fact, if properly implemented, Grutter’s nar-
row tailoring provisions inherently facilitate the admission of a criti-
cal mass of perspectives and experiences within racial groups.  Unlike 
a racial quota, numerical goal/range, or a Gratz-type point system, a 
critical mass cannot be attained merely by identifying an applicant’s 
race and mechanically using this information.  A holistic admissions 
process—which includes individualized review, considers race in a 
flexible manner, and uses diversity factors other than race—is neces-
sary to yield a critical mass that includes diversity within racial groups.  
By definition, achieving such within-group diversity reduces stigmatic 
harm, because it requires admissions committees to consider factors 
besides race and to treat applicants of the same race differently based 
on non-racial factors.127  These were precisely the concerns expressed 
in Justice Kennedy’s Grutter dissent.128 
 
125 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342 (“[R]ace-conscious admissions policies must be limited in 
time. . . . In the context of higher education, the durational requirement can be met by 
sunset provisions in race-conscious admissions policies and periodic reviews to determine 
whether racial preferences are still necessary to achieve student body diversity.”). 
126 See Adams, supra note 99, at 1953 (noting that “the balancing performed by Justice 
O’Connor in the Grutter case is as an example of cost-benefit balancing between societal 
harms and societal benefits”); Rubenfeld, supra note 115, at 438 (noting that strict scruti-
ny in recent equal protection jurisprudence can be viewed as “a cost-benefit justificatory 
test . . . [which] . . . serve[s] to determine whether a law that causes acknowledged consti-
tutional harms is justified by sufficiently important benefits that a less constitutionally 
costly . . . law could not have achieved”).  Professor Reva Siegal articulates the principle of 
antibalkanization in equal protection jurisprudence, which similarly balances the costs and 
benefits of race conscious policies.  See Reva B. Siegal, From Colorblindness to Antibalkina-
tion: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 Yale L.J. 1278, 1299 (2011) 
(noting that “Justice O’Connor interprets equal protection so as to promote social cohe-
sion and to avoid racial arrangements that balkanize and threaten social cohesion.  Con-
cern with balkanization thus supplies affirmative reason to allow affirmative action and to 
limit it . . .”). 
127 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 309.  (“The Law School’s admissions program . . . is flexible enough to 
ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes race 
or ethnicity the defining feature of the application. . . . The Law School engages in a 
highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant’s file, giving serious consideration 
to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment.  
There is no policy, either de jure or de facto, of automatic acceptance or rejection based on 
any single ‘soft’ variable . . . . Also, the program adequately ensures that all factors that 
may contribute to diversity are meaningfully considered alongside race.”)  See also Gratz v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271 (2003) (noting that “Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke em-
phasized the importance of considering each particular applicant as an individual, as-
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D.  Standards of Review in Grutter:  The Need for Deference to Universities 
Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Grutter also contends that the Grutter 
majority abandoned strict scrutiny129 and critiques the majority for its 
deference to the Law School.130  The Grutter opinion does delineate 
multiple standards of review, deferring to universities’ “good faith” 
that racial diversity is necessary to attain educational benefits, while 
still applying strict scrutiny (the “least stigmatic means”) to evaluate 
the manner in which race is used (or at least claiming to do so).131  
The “good faith” standard with respect to the educational benefits of 
diversity is a natural consequence of the analysis presented earlier:  
because critical mass is a complex entity and cannot be measured ac-
curately by courts, universities are in the best position to determine 
the level and type of diversity needed to fulfill their educational mis-
sions.  Grutter also cites the Supreme Court’s “tradition of giving a de-
gree of deference to a university’s academic decisions, within consti-
 
sessing all of the qualities that individual possesses, and in turn, evaluating that individu-
al’s ability to contribute to the unique setting of higher education”).  For an example of 
how the Supreme Court envisioned this would work, see Gratz, 244 U.S. at 272–73 
(“[I]nstructive in our consideration . . . is the example . . . which Justice Powell both dis-
cussed in, and attached to, his opinion in Bakke.  The example was included to ‘illustrate 
the kind of significance attached to race’ . . . [i]t provided as follows:  ‘The Admissions 
Committee, with only a few places left to fill, might find itself forced to choose between A, 
the child of a successful black physician in an academic community with promise of supe-
rior academic performance, and B, a black who grew up in an inner-city ghetto of semi-
literate parents whose academic achievement was lower but who had demonstrated ener-
gy and leadership as well as an apparently abiding interest in black power.  If a good 
number of black students much like A but few like B had already been admitted, the 
Committee might prefer B; and vice versa.  If C, a white student with extraordinary artis-
tic talent, were also seeking one of the remaining places, his unique quality might give 
him an edge over both A and B.  Thus, the critical criteria are often individual qualities 
or experience not dependent upon race but sometimes associated with it.” (quoting Re-
gents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 324 (1978))). 
128 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 392–93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“There is no constitutional objec-
tion to the goal of considering race as one modest factor among many others to achieve 
diversity . . .”).  Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Grutter stemmed from his belief, based on the 
facts, that the University of Michigan School of Law did use race as a predominant factor.  
Id. at 389 (noting that at the University of Michigan School of Law, “race is likely out-
come determinative for many members of minority groups”).  He further noted that “an 
educational institution must ensure, through sufficient procedures, that each applicant 
receives individual consideration and that race does not become a predominant factor in 
the admissions decisionmaking.”  Id. at 393. 
129 Id. at 387 (contending that “[t]he Court . . . does not apply strict scrutiny” in Grutter). 
130 Id. at 394 (“Deference is antithetical to strict scrutiny, not consistent with it.”). 
131 Id. at 326 (Opinion of the Court) (noting that the Court has “held that all racial classifi-
cations imposed by government ‘must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scru-
tiny’”).  But see supra notes 129–30, and accompanying text (Justice Kennedy stating that 
the Grutter majority did not apply strict scrutiny). 
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tutionally prescribed limits[,]”132 particularly with respect to “complex 
educational judgments in an area that lies primarily within the exper-
tise of the university.”133  Thus, both pragmatic and doctrinal reasons 
exist for deferring to universities’ judgment on the educational bene-
fits of diversity. 
Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy’s Grutter dissent takes strong issue 
with such deference, critiquing the majority for being “satisfied by the 
Law School’s profession of its own good faith.”134  This aspect of Grut-
ter is likely to be modified or overturned when the Supreme Court 
decides Fisher.  Part IV of this Article proposes a more nuanced, al-
ternative interpretation of Grutter’s deference and judicial review pro-
visions—one that addresses Justice Kennedy’s concerns as applied to 
Fisher. 
In sum, this Part has illustrated how critical mass and Grutter’s 
least stigmatic means theory of narrow tailoring encompass diversity 
within groups.  Within-group diversity is relevant to the constitution-
ality of race-conscious admissions for several reasons:  1. It distin-
guishes critical mass from racial quotas and numerical goals; 2. It fa-
cilitates the educational benefits of diversity articulated in Grutter; 3. 
It reduces the stigmatic harm of race-conscious policies; and 4. It clar-
ifies the need for courts’ deference to universities with respect to ad-
missions policies.  Moreover, as the analysis of Fisher in the subse-
quent Parts will illustrate, race-conscious admissions policies may be 
used not only to increase numbers of minority students, but also spe-
cifically to target particular subgroups of minority students in order 
to increase diversity within racial groups. 
 
132 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328. 
133 Id.  See also id. at 329.  (“We have long recognized that, given the important purpose of 
public education and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the 
university environment, universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradi-
tion. . . . In announcing the principle of student body diversity as a compelling state in-
terest, Justice Powell invoked our cases recognizing a constitutional dimension, grounded 
in the First Amendment, of educational autonomy:  ‘The freedom of a university to make 
its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student body.’. . . From this 
premise, Justice Powell reasoned that by claiming ‘the right to select those students who 
will contribute the most to the ‘robust exchange of ideas,’ a university seek[s] to achieve a 
goal that is of paramount importance in the fulfillment of its mission.’” (quoting Regents 
of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1977))).  Bakke, 385 U.S. at 319 n.53 (Powell, 
J., concurring) (“Universities . . . may make individualized decisions, in which ethnic 
background plays a part, under a presumption of legality and legitimate educational pur-
pose.  So long as the university proceeds on an individualized, case-by-case basis, there is 
no warrant for judicial interference in the academic process.”). 
134 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 394 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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III.  FISHER V. TEXAS, CRITICAL MASS, AND DEFERENCE TO UNIVERSITIES 
Part II illustrated the internal logic and theoretical coherence of 
Grutter’s various components.  This Part discusses the application of 
“critical mass” in Fisher v. Texas and the Fifth Circuit panel’s defer-
ence to UT in determining whether it had enrolled a “critical mass.”  
It then presents a critique of the Fifth Circuit’s Fisher opinion on the-
se bases, setting the stage for the proposed alternative method to de-
cide Fisher. 
A.  Overview 
Fisher v. University of Texas135 is the Supreme Court’s first oppor-
tunity to clarify Grutter’s critical mass concept.136  In order to under-
stand Fisher, it is necessary to briefly review the University of Texas’s 
changing undergraduate admissions policy and provide historical 
context for the case.137 
1.  Hopwood v. Texas and the Top Ten Percent Law 
Prior to the Fifth Circuit’s 1996 decision in Hopwood v. Texas,138 the 
University of Texas (“UT”) used a variety of race-conscious admis-
sions procedures, and in the fall of 1993, these resulted in an incom-
ing freshman class that was 4.5% African American and 15.6% Lati-
na/o.139  In 1996, Hopwood outlawed the use of race-conscious policies 
in the Fifth Circuit (Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi), and as a re-
sult, for fall of 1997, the African American enrollment in the incom-
ing class dropped to 2.7% and the Latina/o enrollment dropped to 
 
135 631 F.3d 213, 246 (5th Cir. 2011) (upholding the University of Texas at Austin’s race-
conscious undergraduate admissions policy). 
136 In Parents Involved in Community Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007), the 
Court did consider and strike down race-conscious assignment plans for public schools, 
but the definition of critical mass was not a factor in the Court’s decision.  In fact, the 
Court distinguished these assignment plans from the holistic admissions policy upheld in 
Grutter.  Id. at 705.  (“In Grutter, the number of minority students the school sought to 
admit was an undefined ‘meaningful number’ necessary to achieve a genuinely diverse 
student body . . . and the Court concluded that the law school did not count back from its 
applicant pool to arrive at that number[.] . . . Here, in contrast, the schools worked 
backward to achieve a particular type of racial balance, rather than working forward from 
some demonstration of the level of diversity that provides the purported benefits.  This is 
a fatal flaw under the Court’s existing precedent.”). 
137 Fisher, 631 F.3d at 222–31 (describing the history of changes in the University of Texas at 
Austin undergraduate admissions policy). 
138 Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). 
139 Fisher, 631 F.3d at 223. 
Nov. 2012] DIVERSITY WITHIN RACIAL GROUPS 499 
 
12.6%.140  In response, the Texas legislature passed the Top Ten Per-
cent Law,141 which guaranteed admission to any Texas state university 
to Texas public high school seniors in the top ten percent of their 
class.142  This law was intended to increase minority representation 
without directly using race as part of the admissions process.143  By 
2004, partly as a result of the Top Ten Percent Law, the percentage of 
African Americans in the incoming class had increased to 4.5% and 
the percentage of Latina/os increased to 16.9%.144 
2.  Post-Grutter Return of Race-Conscious Admissions 
With the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Grutter, Hopwood was 
overturned, and race-conscious admissions policies, in accordance 
with Grutter’s principles, were once again permissible in Texas to en-
roll a critical mass of underrepresented minority students.  UT con-
ducted a series of studies to determine whether it was enrolling a crit-
ical mass and concluded that it was not.  One study found that of 
classes with ten to twenty-four students at UT, 89% had zero to one 
African American student, 41% had zero to one Asian American stu-
dent, and 37% had zero to one Latina/o student.  Another study 
which surveyed undergraduate students found that a majority felt 
that there was “insufficient minority representation” for the “full 
benefits of diversity to occur,”145 and that minority students reported 
feeling isolated.146 
In response, UT created a new, multifaceted admissions policy 
which significantly increased the enrollment of African American and 
Latina/o students, and also of Asian American students in the next 
few years.147  The vast majority of African American and Latina/o stu-
dents were admitted under the Top Ten Percent Law, which was still 
in effect, as were over 80% of total admitted students to the Universi-
 
140 Id. at 224. 
141 Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 51.803 (2009).  In 2011, the Top Ten Percent Law was amended 
“to cap the number of students guaranteed admission at UT Austin to 75% of the seats 
available to Texas residents.”  Fisher, 631 F.3d at 224 n.56. 
142 Fisher, 631 F.3d at 224. 
143 Id. (“The Top Ten Percent Law did not by its terms admit students on the basis of race, 
but underrepresented minorities were its announced target and their admission a large, if 
not primary, purpose.”). 
144 Id.  Part of this increase may have been due to demographic changes in the state of Tex-
as.  Id. at 226. 
145 Id. at 225. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 226.  It is possible that some of these increases were due in part to demographic 
changes in the state of Texas.  Id. 
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ty of Texas.148  The rest of the class was admitted on the basis of two 
measures:  1. Academic Index—a formula that predicts first year GPA 
based on high school class rank and standardized test scores;149 and 2. 
Personal Achievement Index (“PAI”)—based on holistic evaluation of 
an applicant’s entire file, including essays and a personal achieve-
ment score which factors in extracurricular activities, family and soci-
oeconomic background, academic achievement as related to these 
variables, and race.150 
The PAI is a numerical score based on ratings by admissions staff 
members, but consistent with the Gratz/Grutter framework, it does not 
attach a specific weight to race in the application process.151  The PAI 
was the only “race-conscious” element of the new UT admissions 
plan. 
3.  Plaintiffs’ Claim 
Plaintiffs152 Abigail Fisher and Rachel Michalewicz were both de-
nied admission to the University of Texas for the entering class of fall 
2008 and filed suit, alleging that UT’s race-conscious admissions poli-
cy violated the Equal Protection Clause.  Specifically, the Plaintiffs 
claimed that the race-conscious aspects of the UT admissions policy 
were unwarranted because a “race-neutral” policy, the Top Ten Per-
cent Law, had already yielded a critical mass of African American and 
 
148 Id. at 229.  In 2011, the Top Ten Percent Law was amended “to cap the number of stu-
dents guaranteed admission at UT Austin to 75% of the seats available to Texas resi-
dents.”  Id. at 224 n.56. 
149 Id. at 222. 
150 Id. at 227–28. 
151 Id. at 228.  Also noteworthy is the fact that any applicant, of any race, could benefit from 
UT’s race-conscious admissions policy:   
[R]ace can enhance the personal achievement score of a student from any racial 
background, including whites and Asian-Americans.  For example, a white student 
who has demonstrated substantial community involvement at a predominantly 
Hispanic high school may contribute a unique perspective that produces a greater 
personal achievement score than a similarly situated Hispanic student from the 
same school.  This possibility is the point of Grutter’s holistic and individualized as-
sessments, which must be “flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of 
diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant.”  Indeed, just as 
in Grutter, UT applicants of every race may submit supplemental information to 
highlight their potential diversity contributions, which allows students who are di-
verse in unconventional ways to describe their unique attributes. 
  Id. at 236 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978)). 
152 This Article will refer to the parties who brought Fisher as the “Plaintiffs,” although the 
Fisher opinion sometimes refers to them as “Appellants” or “Plaintiffs-Appellants.”  The 
Plaintiffs were also the “Petitioner” at the Supreme Court (where Abigail Noel Fisher was 
the only remaining Plaintiff).  See Brief of Petitioner, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (2012) (No. 
11-345).  For purposes of this Article, all of these terms are interchangeable. 
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Latina/o students without the additional race-conscious measure (the 
Personal Achievement Index).153  Thus, the issue in Fisher is different 
than that in Bakke,154 Hopwood,155 Gratz,156 and Grutter.157  All of those 
earlier cases were brought by Plaintiffs who claimed that their grades 
and standardized test scores would have almost certainly garnered 
them admission if they had been a member of a designated ra-
cial/ethnic group (usually Black or Latina/o).  The Plaintiffs in Fish-
er, in contrast, did not argue that UT would have admitted them but 
for the race-conscious policy.158  Rather, they contended that UT had 
achieved sufficient diversity—a critical mass of underrepresented mi-
nority students—through its race-neutral Top Ten Percent Law.159  
Consequently, given Grutter’s preference for race-neutral alternatives, 
the Plaintiffs argued that UT could not use a race-conscious admis-
sions plan.160 
4.  Fifth Circuit Ruling in Fisher 
The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, 
in a ruling by Judge Sam Sparks, rejected the Plaintiffs’ arguments 
and granted summary judgment to UT.161  A three judge panel of the 
Fifth Circuit affirmed the ruling and elaborated upon several of the 
issues presented.  The Fifth Circuit majority opinion in Fisher, by 
Judge Patrick Higginbotham, framed Grutter as “holding that diversi-
ty, including seeking a critical mass of minority students, is ‘a compel-
ling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admis-
 
153 Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 19, Fisher, 631 F.3d 213, (No. 09-50822). 
154 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 277. 
155 Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 938 (5th Cir. 1996). 
156 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 251–52 (2003). 
157 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 316–17 (2003). 
158 See Brown-Nagin, supra note 7, at 115 (“Fisher does not claim that racial consideration . . . 
necessarily doomed her prospects.  No evidence supports that position.  The record 
shows that a total of 216 black and Latino applicants gained acceptance to UT through 
holistic review in 2008, when Fisher unsuccessfully applied to UT.  The plaintiff concedes 
that race played no role in the admission of 183 of those 216 students . . . [t]he record is 
inconclusive on whether [the remaining] thirty-three black and Latino students benefit-
ted from race.”). 
159 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex, 631 F.3d 213, 234 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting that Plaintiffs “question 
whether UT needs a Grutter-like policy . . . [because] UT’s minority enrollment under the 
Top Ten Percent Law already surpassed critical mass . . . .”). 
160 See id. (“[Plaintiffs] do not allege that UT’s race-conscious admissions policy is functional-
ly different from, or gives greater consideration to race than, the policy upheld in Grutter.  
Rather, [Plaintiffs] question whether UT needs a Grutter-like policy.”). 
161 Fisher, 556 F. Supp. 2d 603 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (denying motion for preliminary injunc-
tion). 
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sions.’”162  The Fifth Circuit panel rejected the Plaintiffs’ argument 
that UT’s admissions policy amounts to racial balancing because it 
focuses on demographically underrepresented groups.163  The panel 
noted that demographics were only considered in assessing the initial 
need for a race-conscious policy, not during the actual admissions 
process.164  Applying a “good faith” standard,165 the panel also de-
ferred to UT’s judgment that race-conscious policies were still neces-
sary to attain a critical mass and actualize the educational benefits of 
diversity.  Judge Higginbotham’s opinion, along with the concur-
rence by Judge Emilio Garza, both found that UT’s admissions policy 
was consistent with Grutter, although in dicta, Judge Garza expounded 
upon his disdain for Grutter.166  Also in dicta, Judge Higginbotham was 
very critical of the Top Ten Percent Law, stating that it excluded well 
qualified minority students who attended more competitive high 
schools, and that it threatened to make UT’s race-conscious policies 
unnecessary and unconstitutional.167 
In June 2011, by a narrow vote of 9-7, the Fifth Circuit denied the 
Plaintiffs’ request for a rehearing of Fisher en banc.168  Chief Judge 
Edith Jones authored a dissenting opinion, joined by four other 
judges.169  Chief Judge Jones’s critiques of Judge Higginbotham’s Fish-
er opinion were threefold.  First, Chief Judge Jones contended that 
Fisher essentially abrogates strict scrutiny by replacing Grutter’s narrow 
tailoring inquiry with a “good faith” standard.170  Additionally, Judge 
Jones’s dissent found that the minimal impact of UT’s race-conscious 
policy—the fact that over 80% of students are admitted through the 
race-neutral Top Ten Percent plan—calls into question whether the 
race-conscious policy is necessary to attain the educational benefits of 
 
162 Fisher, 631 F.3d at 219 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325). 
163 Fisher, 631 F.3d at 235–36. 
164 Id. at 236. 
165 Id. at 233 (“[S]o long as a university considers race in a holistic and individualized man-
ner, and not as part of a quota or fixed-point system, courts must afford a measure of def-
erence to the university’s good faith determination that certain race-conscious measures 
are necessary to achieve the educational benefits of diversity, including attaining critical 
mass in minority enrollment.”). 
166 Id. at 247 (Garza, J., specially concurring) (stating that “Grutter represents a digression in 
the course of constitutional law”). 
167 See infra Part III.B.3. 
168 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 644 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 2011) (denying en banc rehearing). 
169 Id. at 303 (Jones, C.J., dissenting). 
170 Chief Judge Jones contended that the court “may presume a university’s good faith in the 
decision that it has a compelling interest in achieving racial and other student diversity.  
But that is as about as far as deference should go.”  Id. at 305 n.3. 
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diversity.171  Finally, Chief Judge Jones contended that the application 
of critical mass at the classroom level “offers no stopping point for ra-
cial preferences.”172  Under Fisher, a college or university could use 
lack of representation of minorities in any class or major as justifica-
tion for a race-conscious policy, and this emphasis on diversity at the 
classroom level “offers no ground for serious judicial review of a ter-
minus of the racial preference policy.”173 
The Plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United 
States Supreme Court, which after several delays,174 the Court granted 
on February 21, 2012.  The question presented in Fisher is as follows:  
“Whether this Court’s decisions interpreting the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, including Grutter v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 306 (2003), permit the University of Texas at Austin’s use of 
 
171 For a counterargument to Chief Judge Jones’s contention here, see infra Part V.C.2 (argu-
ing that a race-conscious admissions policy could be useful in attaining within-group di-
versity even if it only affects small numbers of students, because it is the novel and diverse 
perspectives those students bring, not their small numbers, that ties the race-conscious 
policies to the educational benefits of diversity).  In fact, race-conscious policies with a 
smaller impact are preferable because they create less stigmatic harm.  Moreover, as insti-
tutions gradually phase out race-conscious policies in accordance with Grutter’s sunset re-
quirement, one should expect a gradual reduction in their impact.  See infra Part V.C.3. 
172 Fisher, 644 F.3d at 307.  Chief Justice Roberts also raised this issue in the Fisher oral argu-
ment at the Supreme Court.  See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 46 (asking 
UT’s counsel “[w]hat is the logical end point [to your use of race]?”).  See also Brown-
Nagin, supra note 7, at 126 (noting that some Justices “might find the appellant’s plea for 
an upper limit on critical mass—a ceiling and a firm endpoint—appealing.  Without 
some concrete foundation for critical mass, Texas’s pursuit of the right mix of un-
derrepresented students arguably is limitless and would permit consideration of race in 
perpetuity”).  The “ceiling” and the “endpoint” here are actually different concepts, and 
the term “stopping point” in Chief Judge Jones’ dissent could have two different mean-
ings:  1. The “ceiling”:  A limiting principle on the weight of race in the admissions pro-
cess.  This is discussed infra in Part V.B.; or 2. The “end point”:  the termination of race-
conscious policies altogether, in accordance with Grutter’s preference for race-neutral pol-
icies and its “sunset” provision.  Part V.C.3 infra discusses how race preferences can be 
gradually phased out. 
173 Fisher, 644 F.3d at 307. 
174 On September 15, 2011, the Plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Fisher, 644 F.3d 301 (No. 11-345).  UT 
did not file a response brief, and the Supreme Court requested a response from UT by 
November 30, 2011, later extending that deadline until December 7, 2011.  See Lyle Den-
niston, Affirmative Action Case Develops, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 1, 2011, 5:05 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/11/affirmative-action-case-develops/.  UT then filed 
its response, arguing against certiorari largely on inappropriate vehicle grounds.  See Brief 
in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Fisher, 644 F.3d 301 (No. 11-345).  The 
Court was first scheduled to consider the cert petition in conference on January 13, 2012, 
and then deferred consideration to its January 20 conference, and then again until the 
February 3 conference, before finally granting certiorari on February 21.  See Fisher v. 
Texas Docket, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx? 
FileName=/docketfiles/11-345.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2012). 
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race in undergraduate admissions decisions.”175  The Supreme Court 
heard oral arguments in Fisher on October 10, 2012,176 and the 
Court’s ruling should occur in early 2013. 
B.  Critical Mass as Applied in Fisher 
Fisher v. Texas represents the first post-Grutter litigation on affirma-
tive action in higher education to apply the critical mass concept.  
The arguments in Fisher with respect to critical mass focused mainly 
on numbers and percentages of minority students.  While the Fifth 
Circuit’s opinion espoused a more comprehensive definition of “crit-
ical mass,” its analysis was also based largely on numbers. 
1.  Plaintiffs’ View of Critical Mass 
The Fisher Plaintiffs’ analysis of critical mass focused solely on 
campus-wide numbers of minority students.  They argued that 21.4% 
minority (African American and Latina/o) enrollment at UT was a 
sufficient critical mass, noting that in Grutter, the University of Michi-
gan School of Law only attained 13.5% to 20.1% minority enrollment 
in the years preceding the lawsuit.177  The Plaintiffs argued that the 
concept of critical mass is defined as “sufficient number of un-
derrepresented minority students such that such minority students 
would ‘not feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race.’”178  The 
Fifth Circuit panel purported to reject this view and was clear in not-
ing that critical mass did not refer to “any fixed number.” 
2.  UT and Fifth Circuit Panel’s View of Critical Mass 
The University of Texas had described critical mass in more ab-
stract terms such as “meaningful representation”; however, the Uni-
versity’s argument also centered on numbers.  UT argued that:  1. 
The Plaintiffs improperly combined African Americans and Lati-
 
175 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc denied), cert. granted, 132 S. 
Ct. 1536 (Feb. 21, 2012) (No. 11-345). 
176 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1. 
177 Fisher, 631 F.3d at 243.  The Plaintiffs also argued “that minority enrollment at UT now 
exceeds the level it had reached in the mid-1990s, pre-Hopwood, when the University was 
free to obtain any critical mass it wanted through overtly race-based decisions.”  Id. at 244. 
178 Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 6, Fisher, 631 F.3d 213 (No. 09-50822).  See also Fisher, 631 
F.3d at 243 (noting that the Plaintiffs contend that “the concept of critical mass is defined 
by the minimum threshold for minority students to have their ideas represented in class 
discussions and not to feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race”). 
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na/os for purposes of assessing critical mass;179 and 2. In any case, crit-
ical mass had not been attained within the student body or at the 
“classroom level.”180 
To support this argument, UT noted that a large percentage of its 
seminar classes, with ten to twenty-four students, had only zero or one 
Black, Latino, and/or Asian American student.181  These small classes 
are presumably the classroom settings where racial stereotypes could 
be broken down and cross-racial understanding could be fostered, 
and unless there are at least two students of any group, there cannot 
be diverse perspectives represented from that group.  In that sense, 
diversity within racial groups was implicit in UT’s concept of critical 
mass, although not stated directly.182 
UT’s response may have been a simple legal strategy for the lower 
court case, as it directly refuted the Plaintiffs’ claims in the clearest 
and simplest manner possible, and it provided a more nuanced view 
of “critical mass.”  Nevertheless, it did not fully articulate how within-
group diversity has its own benefits and relates to the critical mass 
concept,183 and it did not clearly distinguish critical mass from numer-
 
179 Brief of Appellees at 46, Fisher, 631 F.3d 213 (No. 09-50822) (“Plaintiffs . . . commit the 
fatal error of combining two different groups of underrepresented minorities in order to 
determine critical mass.”). 
180 See id. at 48–49 (arguing that UT’s classroom study “provides a dramatic illustration of the 
absence of diversity on campus at UT prior to 2005 . . . [and] . . . only further drama-
tized . . . that UT lacked sufficient diversity, including a critical mass of minority students, 
across the entire student body . . .”). 
181 See Fisher, 631 F.3d at 225 (“According to [UT’s study of classroom diversity], 90% of these 
smaller classes in Fall 2002 had either one or zero African-American students, 46% had 
one or zero Asian-American students, and 43% had one or zero Hispanic students.” (in-
ternal citations omitted)).  Presumably, UT omitted the smallest classes—those with fewer 
than ten students—because they would be statistically unlikely to have more than zero or 
one students from various minority groups even if the number of minority students in-
creased significantly. 
182 Judge Sam Sparks’s district court opinion in Fisher also suggests this point.  See Fisher v. 
Univ. of Tex., 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 602–03 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (“Critical mass, which is an 
adequate representation of minority students to assure educational benefits deriving from 
diversity, affects in a positive way all students because they learn that there is not ‘one’ 
minority or majority view. . . . [T]here is a compelling educational interest for the Univer-
sity not to have large numbers of classes in which there are no students—or only a single 
student—of a given underrepresented race or ethnicity.”). 
183 In its brief to the Supreme Court, UT does note that “[p]etitioner completely overlooks 
the diversity within racial groups that UT’s holistic plan fosters.”  Brief for Respondents at 
20, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (2012) (No. 11-345).  UT’s Supreme Court brief also asserts 
that “[h]olistic review permits the consideration of diversity within racial groups.”  Id. at 
33.  However, UT does not elaborate upon this idea or analyze it in depth, as this Article 
does.  Additionally, the amicus brief for the Society of American Law Teachers, support-
ing UT and citing a draft of this Article, notes that Black and Latino students admitted 
under UT’s race-conscious policy “could contribute to diversity in various ways.”  See Brief 
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ical goals at the classroom level.184  Part V infra will discuss some other 
ways in which the goal of attaining diversity within racial groups 
might be used to justify a race-conscious admissions policy. 
Judge Higginbotham’s Fisher opinion noted that the Supreme 
Court in Grutter was divided over the meaning of “critical mass,” but it 
cited Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion, which defined “critical 
mass” through “reference to the educational benefits that diversity is 
designed to produce.”185  The Fifth Circuit panel defined these bene-
fits in broad terms:  1. “Increased Perspectives”—those brought by di-
verse groups of students into the classroom, which add valuable 
knowledge and make for engaging classroom discussions; 2. “Profes-
sionalism”—preparing students for “work and citizenship” by expos-
ing them to diverse people and viewpoints; and 3. “Civic Engage-
ment”—creating paths to leadership for individuals of every race and 
ethnicity.186  However, the Fifth Circuit did not apply this definition 
further; it merely adopted UT’s view of critical mass at the classroom 
level. 
3.  Judge Higginbotham’s Analysis of the Top Ten Percent Law 
Beyond the ruling in Fisher, Judge Higginbotham’s analysis of the 
Top Ten Percent Law illustrates the need to understand critical mass 
in terms of within-group diversity.  The other Fifth Circuit panel 
judges did not join this part of Judge Higginbotham’s opinion, which 
stated that the Top Ten Percent Law “threatens to erode the founda-
tions UT relies on to justify implementing Grutter polices . . . .”187  
Judge Higginbotham noted that the Top Ten Percent Law did lead to 
an increase in minority enrollment, and that by 2008, 81% of incom-
ing in-state students at UT were admitted via the Top Ten Percent 
Law.188  As a consequence, the opinion contended that the Top Ten 
Percent Law precluded UT from admitting minority students who 
went to more competitive schools but did not finish in the top ten 
 
of Society of American Law Teachers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 23, 
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., No. 11-345 (Aug. 13, 2012).  
184 UT argued that it “[d]id [n]ot [a]rticulate a [r]igid, [n]umerical [d]efinition of [c]ritical 
[m]ass.”  Brief of Appellees at 34, Fisher, 631 F.3d 213 (No. 09-50822).  However, while its 
definition may not have been “rigid,” UT did not show how critical mass could be defined 
in any terms other numerical goals or ranges.  See also infra Part III.D.1. 
185 Fisher, 631 F.3d at 219. 
186 Id. at 219–20.  The Fifth Circuit panel also did not discuss the breakdown of racial stereo-
types in classrooms, which was the specific educational benefit that Grutter cited at the 
classroom level.  See supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text; infra Part III.D.2. 
187 Fisher, 631 F.3d at 242. 
188 Id. at 227. 
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percent of their graduating classes, and who could contribute to di-
versity in various ways.189  Judge Higginbotham referred to the Top 
Ten Percent Law as “a polar opposite of the holistic focus upon indi-
viduals” which was sanctioned by Grutter, and noted that “its internal 
proxies for race end-run the Supreme Court’s studied structure for 
use of race in university admissions decisions.”190  Further, he opined:  
“[T]he University does not respond to the reality that the Top Ten 
Percent Law eliminated the consideration of test scores, and corre-
spondingly reduced academic selectivity, to produce increased en-
rollment of minorities.  Such costs may be intrinsic to affirmative ac-
tion plans.  If so, Grutter at least sought to minimize those costs 
through narrow tailoring.  The Top Ten Percent Law is anything but 
narrow.”191 
Thus, in spite of ruling in favor of the University, Judge Hig-
ginbotham also concluded that “[a]ppellants are correct that the de-
cision to [enact the Top Ten Percent Law] . . . places at risk UT’s 
race-conscious admissions policies.”192  Part III.D.4. presents a critique 
of Judge Higginbotham’s analysis of the Top Ten Percent Law’s effect 
on the constitutionality of race-conscious policies. 
C.  Deference to Universities in Fisher 
The issue of deference to universities on determining whether 
they had enrolled a critical mass of minority students was a conten-
tious point in the Fifth Circuit’s Fisher opinion, and it will be a major 
issue when the Supreme Court considers the case.  The question is 
essentially what standard of review courts should apply when evaluat-
ing whether it is necessary for a university to use race-conscious ad-
missions policies to attain the educational benefits of diversity.  In the 
Fisher litigation itself, the two standards debated were “strong basis in 
evidence”193 and “good faith.”194 
 
189 Id.  Unlike Judge Higginbotham, this Article argues that Grutter allows race-conscious pol-
icies to be used specifically to target the minority students noted here.  See infra Part 
V.A.2. 
190 Fisher, 631 F.3d at 242. 
191 Id. at 242. 
192 Id. at 243. 
193 For example, in Ricci v. DeStefano, the Court noted:  “[I]n the context of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . [t]he Court has held that certain govern-
ment actions to remedy past racial discrimination—actions that are themselves based on 
race—are constitutional only where there is a ‘strong basis in evidence’ that the remedial 
actions were necessary.”  129 S. Ct. 2658, 2675 (2009) (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of 
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986)); see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 
469, 500 (1989) (noting same). 
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1.  Plaintiffs’ View of Deference 
To determine whether a university needed to use race-conscious 
admissions policies to attain the educational benefits of diversity, the 
Fisher Plaintiffs argued that the Fifth Circuit should adopt a “strong 
basis in evidence” standard, comparable to that used to evaluate the 
necessity of remedial race-conscious policies in “public employment 
and government contracting cases.”195  This standard would place a 
significantly higher burden on universities than the “good faith” 
standard suggested in Grutter.196  The Fifth Circuit panel rejected this 
argument.197 
 
194 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (“We take the Law School at its word 
that it would ‘like nothing better than to find a race-neutral admissions formula’ and will 
terminate its race-conscious admissions program as soon as practicable.”).  See also Re-
gents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317–18 (1978) (Powell, J., plurality opin-
ion) (presuming good faith of university officials with a facially neutral policy in the ab-
sence of a showing to the contrary).  Justice Kennedy and Chief Judge Jones both view 
such deference to universities as antithetical to strict scrutiny.  See supra note 170 and infra 
notes 248 & 276.  Part IV infra considers the relationship between deference and strict 
scrutiny. 
195 See Fisher, 631 F.3d at 232 (“Appellants urge that Grutter did not extend such deference to 
a university’s decision to implement a race-conscious admissions policy.  Instead, they 
maintain Grutter deferred only to the university’s judgment that diversity would have edu-
cational benefits, not to the assessment of whether the university has attained critical mass 
of a racial group or whether race-conscious efforts are necessary to achieve that end . . . . 
Appellants would have us borrow a more restrictive standard of review . . . in which the 
Supreme Court ‘held that certain government actions to remedy past racial discrimina-
tion—actions that are themselves based on race—are constitutional only where there is a 
‘strong basis in evidence’ that the remedial actions were necessary.’”).  See also supra text 
accompanying note 193 (discussing the “strong basis in evidence” standard). 
196 See supra text accompanying notes 69 and 194. 
197 Specifically, the Fisher Court held that:   
The high standard for justifying the use of race in public employment decisions 
responds to the reality that race used in a backward-looking attempt to remedy 
past wrongs, without focus on individual victims, does not treat race as part of a 
holistic consideration.  In doing so, it touches the third rail of racial quotas.   
           Fisher, 631 F.3d at 233.  The Fisher panel also cited Parents Involved in Community Schools v. 
Seattle School District No. 1 noting that:   
When scrutinizing two school districts’ race-conscious busing plans, the Court in-
voked Grutter’s ‘serious, good faith consideration’ standard, rather than the strong-
basis-in-evidence standard that Appellants would have us apply.  The Parents In-
volved Court never suggested that the school districts would be required to prove 
their plans were meticulously supported by some particular quantum of specific 
evidence.  Rather, the Court struck down the school districts’ programs because 
they pursued racial balancing and defined students based on racial group classifi-
cations, not on individual circumstances. 
           Id. at 233–34 (internal citations omitted).  See also Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seat-
tle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 729 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion) 
(“[W]orking backward to achieve a particular type of racial balance, rather than working 
forward from some demonstration of the level of diversity that provides the purported 
benefits . . .[i]s a fatal flaw under the Court’s existing precedent.”). 
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2.  UT and Fifth Circuit Panel’s View of Deference 
UT argued for a “good faith” standard to assess the need for race-
conscious admissions policies,198 citing Grutter’s deference to universi-
ties in choosing their student bodies.199  As noted earlier,200 the Fifth 
Circuit panel adopted this view,201 which was heavily criticized by 
Chief Judge Jones in her dissent to the en banc denial.202 
D.  Critiquing Fisher’s Approach to Critical Mass and Deference 
There are several critiques of the application of critical mass and 
deference to universities in Fisher, including those noted by Chief 
Judge Jones in her dissent.203  Because the two issues, critical mass and 
deference, are intricately linked in the Fifth Circuit’s analysis,204 this 
Section considers them together. 
1.  Focus on Numbers and Percentages 
In spite of the Fifth Circuit panel’s elaborate articulation of diver-
sity-related objectives in Fisher, and its claim that critical mass should 
be defined in terms of the educational benefits of diversity, rather 
than by numbers,205 the panel’s analysis focused largely on numbers.  
It adopted UT’s notion of critical mass at the classroom level, but it 
did not articulate any theory that would allow Fisher to be decided on 
a basis other than whether a particular number or percentage of mi-
nority students were present at the classroom level.  One might argue 
that because it did not adopt any fixed number as a critical mass, Fish-
 
198 See Brief of Appellees at 25–26, Fisher, 631 F.3d 213 (No. 09-50822) (arguing that given “a 
university’s unique First Amendment rights[,] . . . universities are entitled to ‘a degree of 
deference’—and a ‘presum[ption]’ of ‘good faith’—‘absent a showing to the contrary.’ 
Courts must therefore ‘defer’ to the considered judgment of admissions officials—and 
must not interfere with their admissions policies and decisions—unless officials have act-
ed unreasonably or in bad faith”). 
199 Id.  See also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328–29. 
200 See supra Part III.A.4. 
201 Fisher, 631 F.3d at 233 (“Grutter teaches that so long as a university considers race in a ho-
listic and individualized manner, and not as part of a quota or fixed-point system, courts 
must afford a measure of deference to the university’s good faith determination that cer-
tain race-conscious measures are necessary to achieve the educational benefits of diversi-
ty, including attaining critical mass in minority enrollment.”). 
202 See supra note 170. 
203 See supra notes 169–71 and accompanying text. 
204 Essentially, the Fifth Circuit deferred to UT not only with respect to the need for race-
conscious admissions policies, but also on the meaning of “critical mass.” 
205 See supra notes 58 and 185–86 and accompanying text. 
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er is not in conflict with Bakke’s proscription of numerical goals.206  
However, by its very conclusion that the numbers of minority students 
in UT’s participatory-size classes did not constitute a critical mass, the 
Fifth Circuit’s Fisher opinion implies that some number or percent-
age—perhaps having at least two Black, Latino, and Asian American 
students in every class—would constitute a “critical mass.”  If this is 
the case, then that number or percentage effectively becomes a nu-
merical goal.207  Fisher then runs dangerously close to Justice Kenne-
dy’s concern that “critical mass is . . . used . . . to achieve numerical 
goals indistinguishable from quotas.”208  And if there is no such theo-
retical goal, then Chief Judge Jones’s critique209 that Fisher offers no 
meaningful ground for judicial review is valid.210 
2.  Incomplete Consideration of the Educational Benefits of Diversity 
As noted, Fisher discussed critical mass in terms of “the education-
al benefits that diversity is designed to produce,”211  and the Fifth Cir-
cuit stated these as:  “Increased Perspectives,” “Professionalism,” and 
“Civic Engagement.”212  The Grutter majority opinion was more nu-
anced, specifically linking critical mass to the breakdown of racial ste-
reotypes through classroom discussions—by exposing students to a 
“variety of viewpoints” within each group.213  While it also discussed 
broad societal benefits, such as producing a diverse representation of 
leaders, the Grutter majority delineated the classroom functions of 
critical mass more directly than Fisher, and implicit in those functions 
 
206 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
207 See supra notes 37 and 55 and accompanying text.  Professor Brown-Nagin notes that 
“UT’s reliance on state population figures and classroom- and program-level racial diver-
sity numbers as critical mass metrics is likely to elicit strong objection” and offers “an al-
ternative critical mass benchmark:  the proportion of underrepresented senior high 
school students in Texas whom UT deems viable candidates for admission.”  Brown-
Nagin, supra note 7, at 118.  This Article contends that any numerical benchmark for crit-
ical mass is likely to elicit objection from Justice Kennedy as a violation of Bakke and Grut-
ter’s proscription on quotas and numerical goals.  See supra note 30.  See also supra Part I.A. 
for a general critique of numerical critical mass benchmarks. 
208 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 389 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
209 See supra notes 172–73 and accompanying text. 
210 See infra Part III.D.3. 
211 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 219 (5th Cir. 2011). 
212 Id. at 219–20. 
213 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 319–20 (“[W]hen a critical mass of underrepresented minority stu-
dents is present, racial stereotypes lose their force because nonminority students learn 
there is no ‘minority viewpoint’ but rather a variety of viewpoints among minority stu-
dents.”). 
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was a notion of critical mass that included diversity within racial 
groups.214 
This omission in Fisher is important because the breakdown of ra-
cial stereotypes is key to understanding why critical mass must include 
diversity within racial groups, and why consideration of such within-
group diversity is important in applying Grutter’s principles.215 
3.  Problematic Analysis of the Top Ten Percent Law 
Judge Higginbotham opined (not joined by the other members of 
the three judge panel) that the Top Ten Percent Law, by increasing 
the number of Black and Latino students, raises questions about the 
need for further race-conscious policies.216  As noted earlier, mere 
numbers of minority students do not speak to the constitutionality of 
a race-conscious policy.  Grutter dictated that such policies are neces-
 
214 The Grutter Court grounded the need for a critical mass due to its crucial role in reducing 
stereotypes, noting:   
The Law School does not premise its need for critical mass on ‘any belief that mi-
nority students always (or even consistently) express some characteristic minority 
viewpoint on any issue.’  To the contrary, diminishing the force of such stereotypes 
is both a crucial part of the Law School’s mission, and one that it cannot accom-
plish with only token numbers of minority students.   
  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333.  The Grutter Court also noted that a critical mass has other educa-
tional benefits:   
[T]he Law School’s concept of critical mass is defined by reference to the educa-
tional benefits that diversity is designed to produce.  These benefits are substan-
tial.  As the District Court emphasized, the Law School’s admissions policy pro-
motes “cross-racial understanding,” helps to break down racial stereotypes, and 
“enables students to better understand persons of different races.” 
  Id. at 330. 
215 See supra Parts I.C. and II.  As noted earlier, UT did allude to diversity within racial groups 
in its Supreme Court brief.  See supra note 183 and accompanying text.  UT also noted the 
breakdown of racial stereotypes in its Supreme Court brief.  See infra note 281.  In re-
sponse, the Fisher Plaintiffs critiqued UT’s argument as “a newly minted interest in elitism 
dressed up as ‘intra-racial’ diversity.”  Reply Brief for Petitioner at 1, Fisher v. Univ. of 
Tex. (2012) (No. 11-345).  The Fisher Plaintiffs further contended that “UT’s preference 
for elite minorities has nothing to do with the interest [the Supreme] Court found com-
pelling in Grutter . . . .”  Id. at 14.  Of course, this Article disagrees with the Fisher Plaintiffs’ 
assessment.  See supra Parts I.C. and II.C.  Moreover, the principle of within-group diversi-
ty as a compelling interest would not always or even usually lead to admission of more 
privileged minority students.  At elite private universities, where there are no percentage 
plans and where most admitted minority students are from privileged backgrounds, this 
principle would dictate the admission of more underprivileged minorities to attain diver-
sity within racial groups.  See supra note 8 and infra note 283.   
216 Fisher, 631 F.3d at 243.  (“Appellants are correct that the decision to [enact the Top Ten 
Percent Law] . . . places at risk UT’s race-conscious admissions policies.”).  This Article 
does not endorse or critique the Top Ten Percent Law as a policy.  Rather, it merely con-
tends that Judge Higginbotham’s assertion that the Top Ten Percent Law “places at risk” 
UT’s race-conscious policy is erroneous. 
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sary to attain diversity within racial groups and break down racial ste-
reotypes, not to attain any particular number of minority students.217 
Moreover, as the Fisher panel itself recognized, minority students 
admitted under the Top Ten Percent Law disproportionately enroll 
in certain schools and majors, and are underrepresented in other ma-
jors.218  Judge Higginbotham’s conclusion stated precisely why UT’s 
race-conscious policy is justified in addition to the Top Ten Percent 
Law: 
It is evident that if UT is to have diverse interactions, it needs more mi-
nority students who are interested in and meet the requirements for a 
greater variety of colleges, not more students disproportionately enrolled 
in certain programs.  The holistic review endorsed by Grutter gives UT 
that discretion . . . .219 
Essentially, the principle espoused here is that UT’s race-
conscious policy is constitutionally justifiable to attain within-group 
diversity among minority students, which yields the educational bene-
fits noted in Grutter.220  Judge Higginbotham’s statement that the Top 
Ten Percent Law “places at risk UT’s race-conscious admissions poli-
cies”221 merely obscures this point and is off base.  This also illustrates 
the need for a coherent, well-articulated theory of critical mass that 
explicitly includes within-group diversity.222 
Additionally, in the UT admissions system, the Top Ten Percent 
Law serves largely to admit Black and Latina/o students from segre-
gated public schools.223  UT could justify its race-conscious policy on 
 
217 See supra Part I.C. 
218 Fisher, 631 F.3d at 240 (“While the [Top Ten Percent Law] may have contributed to an 
increase in overall minority enrollment, those minority students remain clustered in cer-
tain programs, limiting the beneficial effects of educational diversity.  For example, near-
ly a quarter of the undergraduate students in UT’s College of Social Work are Hispanic, 
and more than 10% are African-American.  In the College of Education, 22.4% of stu-
dents are Hispanic and 10.1% are African-American.  By contrast, in the College of Busi-
ness Administration, only 14.5% of the students are Hispanic and 3.4% are African-
American.”). 
219 Id. 
220 See supra Parts I.C. and II.C.  In its Supreme Court brief, UT makes a similar point.  See 
supra notes 183 and 281 and accompanying text. 
221 Fisher, 631 F.3d at 243. 
222 See supra Part I.C. 
223 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 303 n.10 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Percent-
age plans depend for their effectiveness on continued racial segregation at the secondary 
school level:  They can ensure significant minority enrollment in universities only if the 
majority-minority high school population is large enough to guarantee that, in many 
schools, most of the students in the top 10% or 20% are minorities.  Moreover, because 
such plans link college admission to a single criterion—high school class rank—they cre-
ate perverse incentives.  They encourage parents to keep their children in low-
performing segregated schools, and discourage students from taking challenging classes 
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grounds of within-group socioeconomic and demographic diversity—
to admit Black and Latina/o students from predominantly White 
schools in more affluent districts.224  Not only would these students be 
more competitive academically,225 but consistent with Grutter’s man-
date, they would add diverse perspectives and experiences within the 
Black and Latina/o student populations on campus.  One common 
stereotype of Black and Latina/o students is that all students from 
these groups come from poor, inner-city backgrounds.  If UT’s race-
conscious policy did indeed target the noted population, then it 
serves directly to break down this racial stereotype, and thus to help 
attain the educational benefits of diversity noted in Grutter.226  Moreo-
ver, the race-conscious policy also adds to the overall diversity of 
viewpoints on campus, as Black and Latina/o students from more 
competitive, predominantly White schools have different experiences 
and perspectives than their counterparts who gain admission through 
the Top Ten Percent Law. 
While there are many possible critiques of the Top Ten Percent 
Law,227 it does not automatically impact the constitutionality of UT’s 
race-conscious admissions policy merely because it increases the 
 
that might lower their grade point averages.”); Jennifer L. Shea, Note, Percentage Plans:  
An Inadequate Substitute for Affirmative Action In Higher Education Admissions, 78 IND. L.J. 
587, 615 (2003) (“In Texas, one critic of the Texas Plan remarked that the ‘very success 
[of the percentage plan] to produce a diverse student body depends on continuing the 
de facto segregation of Texas high schools.’”). 
224 At the Fifth Circuit, UT did not use this defense, focusing instead on critical mass at the 
classroom level.  It did, however, raise a similar point in its Supreme Court brief.  See infra 
note 281. 
225 The Fifth Circuit panel acknowledged this point.  See Fisher, 631 F.3d at 240 n.149 (“[T]he 
Top Ten Percent Law hurts academic selectivity:  UT must admit a top ten percent stu-
dent from a low-performing high school before admitting a more qualified minority stu-
dent who ranks just below the top ten percent at a highly competitive high school.”). 
226 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 319–20 (2003) (“[W]hen a critical mass of underrepre-
sented minority students is present, racial stereotypes lose their force because nonminori-
ty students learn there is no  ‘minority viewpoint’ but rather a variety of viewpoints among 
minority students.”).  UT raised this point in its Supreme Court brief.  See infra note 281.  
Another possible reason to have a mix of minority students from high and low socioeco-
nomic backgrounds is that the former, who have often attended predominantly White 
schools in affluent districts or elite, private schools, may help the latter adjust to elite, 
predominantly White universities.  This argument was raised by Shanta Driver, a lawyer 
for the student intervenors in Grutter, at a debate on affirmative action shortly after the 
Supreme Court’s Grutter ruling.  Social science studies can investigate whether such an ef-
fect does indeed occur and bolster any arguments for within-group diversity by UT and 
other institutions. 
227 See, e.g., supra note 223 (arguing that percentage plans require continued segregation at 
lower academic levels and create perverse incentives). 
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number of minority students.228  As long as UT’s race-conscious policy 
contributes to diversity in a unique manner, by admitting Black and 
Latina/o students from different backgrounds and with different 
viewpoints than those admitted via the Top Ten Percent Law, there is 
no problem with its constitutionality.  Nevertheless, Part V elaborates 
further on how courts can evaluate the contribution of a race-
conscious admissions policy, while also applying strict scrutiny rather 
than the “good faith” standard adopted by the Fifth Circuit panel in 
Fisher. 
4.  The Question of Different Racial Groups 
There is another potential problem that can arise if courts try to 
determine whether an institution has attained a critical mass:  what if 
a race-conscious policy is necessary for some groups but not others?  
Fisher only dealt with numbers and percentages of Black and Latina/o 
students, and the Fifth Circuit seemed to assume that if Black and La-
tina/o students had been sufficiently represented, then the use of 
race would have been deemed entirely unconstitutional.  However, 
this position does not take into account Native Americans and other 
groups.  Even if there were sufficient numbers (and sufficient within-
group diversity) for Black and Latina/o students, UT could still po-
tentially have justified its race-conscious policy for the purpose of 
admitting greater numbers of Native American students, or any other 
racial/ethnic group that is underrepresented.229  Moreover, even if 
the number of Native American students admitted via the race-
conscious policy were very small, these students may still add different 
perspectives and contribute to the educational benefits of diversity. 
 
228 This Article does argue that the Top Ten Percent Law, or any other race-neutral policy 
which is implemented and contributes significantly to racial diversity, may allow more 
stringent review of a co-existing race-conscious admissions policy.  See infra Part IV.C.2.  
However, it would still be erroneous to say that the race-neutral policy automatically puts 
the race-conscious policy in danger; that would only be true if the race-conscious policy 
did not uniquely contribute to diversity above and beyond the race-neutral policy.  See in-
fra Part IV.C.2; see also infra Part V.C.1. 
229 UT’s policy did not grant ex ante preference to any particular group.  See supra note 151 
(stating that “race can enhance the personal achievement score of a student from any ra-
cial background . . .”).  However, it can be presumed, given the University’s arguments, 
that its race-conscious policy primarily targeted Black and Latino students.  Between 2007 
and 2010, UT enrolled no more than twenty-six Native American students in any year, 
and in 2010 the number was only thirteen.  See Report 13:  Implementation and Results of the 
Texas Automatic Admissions Law (HB 588) at the University of Texas at Austin, OFFICE OF 
ADMISSIONS AT THE UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN 8 (Dec. 23, 2010), http://www.utexas.edu/
student/ admissions/research/HB588-Report13.pdf (presenting a report on the demo-
graphic makeup of the top of 10% students entering the University of Texas). 
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Although not raised in Fisher, this example raises some problems 
with assessing critical mass that could occur in another case.  Unlike a 
point system (e.g., the policy rejected in Gratz), race-conscious poli-
cies in a holistic admissions system are not group-specific.  Many dif-
ferent groups could contribute to the critical mass of perspectives 
that actualizes the educational benefits of diversity.  Using demo-
graphic data from one or two groups to determine the constitutional-
ity of an entire race-conscious policy is problematic, as the policy 
could affect enrollment of other groups that may still be underrepre-
sented.  It is quite possible that at least some Native American stu-
dents were admitted under UT’s race-conscious admissions policy; yet 
neither the parties nor the Fifth Circuit addressed the impact on the-
se students if the race-conscious policy is struck down. 
5.  No Meaningful Standard for Judicial Review 
As noted earlier in Part III.D.1, the Fisher panel’s treatment of crit-
ical mass was indistinguishable from a numerical goal.  Moreover, 
even if there is no such theoretical goal implicit in the Fifth Circuit’s 
analysis of critical mass, and even if there were no problem with de-
fining critical mass in terms of numbers, Chief Justice Jones’s criti-
cism that the Fisher opinion offers no meaningful ground for judicial 
review is valid.230  The Fisher opinion did not provide any indication 
regarding what would constitute a critical mass at the classroom level 
or how a court would review whether this goal had been attained; it 
merely deferred to UT.  The panel noted that “[i]f a plaintiff pro-
duces evidence that calls into question a university’s good faith pur-
suit of those educational benefits [that diversity is designed to pro-
duce], its race-conscious admissions policies may be found 
unconstitutional.”231  However, it held that there was “insufficient rea-
son to doubt UT’s good faith conclusion that ‘the University still has 
not reached a critical mass at the classroom level.’”232  Regardless of 
whether this was a valid result,233 it leads one to ask:  1. What would be 
necessary, beyond the evidence presented by the Fisher plaintiffs, to 
create sufficient doubt? and 2. If there were such doubt, how would a 
 
230 See supra note 173 and accompanying text (“In another extension of Grutter, the panel 
opinion’s approval of classroom ‘diversity’ offers no ground for serious judicial review of 
a terminus of the racial preference policy.”). 
231 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 245 (5th Cir. 2011). 
232 Id. at 244. 
233 This Article does not take a position on the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Fisher; it focuses on 
providing an alternative basis for analyzing the case. 
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court evaluate whether the race-conscious policy was, in fact, constitu-
tional?234  These questions are particularly important given Justice 
Kennedy’s concerns about deference to universities in his Grutter dis-
sent.235  The next two Parts take up these questions. 
IV.  THREE CATEGORIES FOR REVIEW:  IMPLEMENTATION VS. 
EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVE VS. NEED 
As noted earlier, the appropriate standard of review—the level of 
deference given to universities—was an issue of contention in Fisher.236  
Moreover, Justice Kennedy’s Grutter dissent distinguished between 
two categories of deference to universities, as he contended that the 
Grutter majority confuses “deference to a university’s definition of its 
educational objective [and] deference to the implementation of this 
goal.”237  An analysis of Grutter and Fisher together suggests that there 
are three separate categories of review when examining deference to 
universities:  1. Review of the actual implementation of race-conscious 
policies as implemented to insure they comply with Grutter’s require-
ments, which requires strict scrutiny; 2. Review of whether the univer-
sity’s educational objective encompasses racial diversity (essentially, 
whether the university has a compelling interest in diversity), which 
requires only “good faith” on the part of the university; and 3. Review 
of whether race-conscious admissions policies are needed to attain 
this educational objective, which is the source of controversy in Fish-
er.238  After delineating these three categories, this Part will focus on 
the last one.  Justice Kennedy’s view of this specific issue—how courts 
should review whether a university needs to use race-conscious poli-
cies to attain its educational objective—will be key to the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Fisher. 
 
234 Part IV provides this Article’s proposed answers to these questions. 
235 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 394 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that 
“[w]ere the courts to apply a searching standard to race-based admissions schemes, that 
would force educational institutions to seriously explore race-neutral alternatives.  
[Which is preferable to] [t]he Court  be[ing] satisfied by the Law School’s profession of 
its own good faith”). 
236 See supra Part III.C. 
237 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
238 See Brief of Appellees at 43, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 644 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-
50822) (“The only dispute with regard to narrow tailoring . . . is whether UT has demon-
strated a valid need for its policy.”). 
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A.  Review of the Implementation of a Race-Conscious Policy—Strict Scrutiny 
The standard of review for race-conscious policies as implemented 
is strict scrutiny:  such policies must adhere to Grutter’s narrow tailor-
ing principles.  The Grutter majority,239 the Fisher three judge panel,240 
Chief Judge Jones’s dissent to the Fisher en banc denial,241 and Justice 
Kennedy’s Grutter dissent242 all agree here.  As noted earlier, there are 
commentators who argue that Grutter’s narrow tailoring test does not 
equate with traditional notions of strict scrutiny,243 and Justice Ken-
nedy’s Grutter dissent contended that the Grutter majority did not ac-
tually apply strict scrutiny when assessing the University of Michigan 
Law School’s admissions policy.244  Nevertheless, in theory, there is 
agreement that strict scrutiny should be the standard of review for 
the implementation of a race-conscious admissions policy. 
B.  Review of a University’s Educational Objective—“Good Faith” 
The standard of review for a university’s educational objective—
whether a university has a compelling interest, given its educational 
goals and mission, in pursuing racial diversity—is “good faith.”  The 
Grutter majority,245 the Fisher three judge panel,246  Chief Judge Jones’s 
dissent to the Fisher en banc denial,247 and Justice Kennedy’s Grutter 
 
239 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 308 (“All government racial classifications must be analyzed by a re-
viewing court under strict scrutiny.”). 
240 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 231 (5th Cir. 2011) (“It is a given that as UT’s Grut-
ter-like admissions program differentiates between applicants on the basis of race, it is 
subject to strict scrutiny with its requirement of narrow tailoring.”). 
241 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 644 F.3d 301, 305 (5th Cir. 2011) (Jones, C.J., dissenting from the 
denial of en banc rehearing) (“[T]he Court[‘s] . . . many holdings . . . have applied con-
ventional strict scrutiny analysis to all racial classifications.”). 
242 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“This Court has reaffirmed, subsequent 
to Bakke, the absolute necessity of strict scrutiny when the State uses race as an operative 
category.”). 
243 See Ayres & Foster, supra note 84 (making a case that the Grutter decision is not an applica-
tion of the traditional “least restrictive means” test for narrow tailoring). 
244 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The Court . . . [in Grutter] . . . does not 
apply strict scrutiny.”); id. at 389 (“The majority fails to confront the reality of how the 
Law School’s admissions policy is implemented.”). 
245 Id. at 343 (“We take the Law School at its word . . . [and] . . . presum[e] good faith of 
university officials . . . .” (internal citations omitted)). 
246 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 233 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[S]o long as a university con-
siders race in a holistic and individualized manner, and not as part of a quota or fixed-
point system, courts must afford a measure of deference to the university’s good 
faith . . . .”). 
247 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 644 F.3d 301, 305 n.3 (5th Cir. 2011) (Jones, C.J., dissenting from 
denial of en banc) (noting that a court “may presume a university’s good faith in the de-
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dissent248 all agree here also.  Courts can presume on good faith that a 
university has a compelling interest in the educational benefits of ra-
cial diversity and that the university’s goals and mission encompass 
this interest.249 
C.  Review of the Need for Race-Conscious Policy to Achieve a University’s 
Educational Objective:  The Question in Fisher 
The standard of review for whether race-conscious policies are 
needed to attain a university’s educational objective (i.e., its compel-
ling interest in racial diversity) is a key issue as the Supreme Court 
considers Fisher.250  The substantive question is whether race-conscious 
policies are needed to attain the educational benefits of diversity, giv-
en that a race-neutral policy (the Top Ten Percent Law) has in-
creased racial diversity.  Is the standard of review a deferential, “good 
faith” standard—as it is for whether the university has a compelling 
interest in racial diversity itself—or is the question of need subject to 
strict scrutiny, as the implementation of race-conscious policies is?251  
The level of judicial review with respect to need was a major point of 
disagreement between the Fisher three judge panel and Chief Judge 
Jones.252  In her dissent to the denial of the Fisher en banc hearing, 
Chief Judge Jones was extremely critical of the Fifth Circuit panel’s 
deference to UT with respect to the need for race-conscious policies; 
she claimed that such deference leaves no place for meaningful judi-
 
cision that it has a compelling interest in achieving racial and other student diversity.  But 
that is as about as far as deference should go”). 
248 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“In the context of university admis-
sions the objective of racial diversity can be accepted . . . but deference is not to be given 
with respect to the methods by which it is pursued.”).  Justice Kennedy’s language here 
suggests that he applies a deferential standard to reviewing a university’s educational 
goals and compelling interest in seeking racial diversity. 
249 See also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319 n.53 (1978) (Powell, J., 
concurring) (“Universities . . . may make individualized decisions, in which ethnic back-
ground plays a part, under a presumption of legality and legitimate educational purpose.  
So long as the university proceeds on an individualized, case-by-case basis, there is no 
warrant for judicial interference in the academic process.”). 
250 Justice Sotomayor raised this question in the Fisher oral arguments.  See Transcript of Oral 
Argument, supra note 1, at 49 (asking UT’s counsel “when do we stop deferring to the 
University’s judgment that race is still necessary?  That’s the bottom line of this case”). 
251 The Fisher Plaintiffs advocated a “strong basis in evidence” standard to evaluate the need 
for race-conscious admissions policies.  See supra notes 193 and 195 and accompanying 
text.  The Fisher three judge panel rejected this standard.  See supra note 197. 
252 See supra Part III.A.4. 
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cial review.253  Chief Judge Jones stated that the Fisher three judge 
panel abrogated strict scrutiny by replacing Grutter’s narrow tailoring 
inquiry with a “good faith” standard,254 and contended that the “good 
faith” standard applied to a university’s compelling interest in diversi-
ty, not to the need for race-conscious policies to attain this diversity.255  
Further, Chief Judge Jones criticized the Fisher panel for its conclu-
sion that:   
[S]o long as a university considers race in a holistic and individualized 
manner, and not as part of a quota or fixed-point system, courts must af-
ford a measure of deference to the university’s good faith determination 
that certain race-conscious measures are necessary to achieve the educa-
tional benefits of diversity, including attaining critical mass in minority 
enrollment.256  
Chief Judge Jones contended that “[t]his statement apparently 
conflates the University’s compelling interest with narrow tailoring, 
or at least it misleads as to the importance of each prong of strict 
scrutiny analysis.”257 
A close reading of Grutter suggests otherwise:  “The Court takes 
the Law School at its word that it would like nothing better than to 
find a race-neutral admissions formula and will terminate its use of 
racial preferences as soon as practicable.”258  This language implies 
that the Supreme Court in Grutter gave “good faith” deference to the 
University of Michigan Law School with respect to the need for race-
conscious admissions policies.  The Fisher three judge panel also in-
terpreted Grutter in this way.259 
Nevertheless, when the Supreme Court decides Fisher, Grutter’s 
“good faith” deference may well not survive.  As noted, Justice Ken-
 
253 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 644 F.3d 301, 307 (5th. Cir. 2011) (arguing “the panel opinion’s 
approval of classroom ‘diversity’ offers no ground for serious judicial review of a terminus 
of the racial preference policy”).  See also supra note 173 and accompanying text.  
254 See Fisher, 644 F.3d at 305 (Jones, C.J., dissenting) (“The Fisher panel opinion . . . sup-
plants strict scrutiny with total deference to University administrators.” (footnote omit-
ted)). 
255 Id. at 305 n.3 (noting that a court “may presume a university’s good faith in the decision 
that it has a compelling interest in achieving racial and other student diversity. But that is 
as about as far as deference should go”). 
256 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 233 (5th Cir. 2011). 
257 Fisher, 644 F.3d at 305. 
258 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 309–10 (2003).  This language—specifically “at its 
word”—implies that the Supreme Court in Grutter gave “good faith” deference to the 
University of Michigan Law School in determining the necessity of its race-conscious poli-
cies. 
259 See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
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nedy was quite critical of this deference;260 it was his chief reason for 
dissenting in Grutter.261  Although his Grutter dissent addressed “educa-
tional objective” and “implementation” rather than need for race-
conscious policies,262 it is likely that Justice Kennedy will apply a high-
er standard of review to assessing need than the Fifth Circuit panel 
did. 
However, there is another method to examine this issue which is 
consistent with Grutter.  The distinction between ex ante and ex post 
deference is significant, in terms of the practicability of judicial re-
view.  Ex ante here refers to assessing the need for race-conscious pol-
icies before a race-neutral strategy has been tried and proven effective 
in increasing diversity.  Ex post, on the other hand, refers to the need 
for such policies after a race neutral policy (such as the Top Ten Per-
cent Law) has been implemented and proven successful in increasing 
racial diversity:  this is the case in Fisher.  This Article argues that ex 
post, it is more practical to apply a higher standard of review and give 
less deference to universities. 
1.  Ex Ante Review with Respect to Need:  “Good Faith” 
It would be very difficult for a court to assess, ex ante, whether any 
viable race-neutral alternative exists for enrolling a critical mass and 
attaining the educational benefits of diversity.  First, there are nu-
merous potential admissions policies that might increase diversity in 
one way or another, and Grutter stated that a university need not ex-
haust all race-neutral alternatives.263  Second, as argued earlier, criti-
cal mass cannot be measured readily,264 and it would be difficult to 
devise judicial standards to determine whether a university has at-
tained a critical mass and the accompanying educational benefits of 
diversity.  This is why Grutter deferred to the “good faith” of universi-
 
260 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 394 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that “[d]eference is antithetical 
to strict scrutiny, not consistent with it” and criticizing the Grutter majority for being “will-
ing to be satisfied by the Law School’s profession of its own good faith”). 
261 See id. at 395 (“If the Court abdicates its constitutional duty to give strict scrutiny to the 
use of race in university admissions, it negates my authority to approve the use of race in 
pursuit of student diversity.”). 
262 See id. at 388 (“The Court confuses deference to a university’s definition of its educational 
objective with deference to the implementation . . . .”).  Kennedy’s dissent here addresses 
the university educational objective and the “implementation” of its race-conscious poli-
cies, but not assessment of the need for race-conscious policies. 
263 Id. at 339 (Opinion of the Court) (“Narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every 
conceivable race-neutral alternative.”).  Of course, Fisher could change this standard. 
264 See supra Part I.C.3. 
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ties on the issue of whether race-neutral admissions policies can ade-
quately replace race-conscious ones.265 
One could thus interpret Grutter as applying “good faith” defer-
ence to universities ex ante on the need for race-conscious admis-
sions policies.  However, Fisher fits into the ex post category, because a 
race-neutral policy—the Top Ten Percent Law—is already in place at 
UT. 
2.  Ex Post Review with Respect to Need:  Strict Scrutiny 
The ex post analysis—after a race-neutral policy has been imple-
mented, as is the case in Fisher—is different.  Here, a more stringent 
level of judicial review is practical and consistent with Grutter.266  A 
court need not just consider the possibilities:  it can instead assess the 
efficacy of the implemented race-neutral policy and compare it to the 
race-conscious policy being challenged.  This can create a meaningful 
standard by which courts can review the need for race-conscious ad-
missions policies.267  If an institution has already implemented a race-
 
265 Grutter actually noted that the Top Ten Percent Law and similar percentage plans are not 
adequate substitutes for race-conscious policies, questioning “how such plans could work 
for graduate and professional schools.”  See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340.  However, the Texas 
legislature had voluntarily adopted the Top Ten Percent Law, along with its consequenc-
es for academic selectivity and diversity.  See supra Part III.A.1.  Nevertheless, the Grutter 
majority opinion also stated that such percentage plans compromise academic selectivity 
and individualized review necessary to attain educational benefits of diversity.  Id.  (“‘Per-
centage plans,’ [which] . . . guarantee admission to all students above a certain class-rank 
threshold in every high school in the State . . . may preclude the university from conduct-
ing the individualized assessments necessary to assemble a student body that is not just 
racially diverse, but diverse along all the qualities valued by the university . . .” and may 
compel universities “to abandon the academic selectivity that is the cornerstone of [their] 
educational mission.”).  It remains to be seen whether these principles survive the Su-
preme Court’s ruling in Fisher.   
266 Grutter did not make the ex ante/ex post distinction and thus did not address ex post re-
view at all. 
267 Courts can also review Plaintiffs’ claims that race-neutral policies would generate suffi-
cient diversity, if those claims are supported by sufficient evidence, such as empirical data.  
See infra Parts V.A. and V.C.1.  Courts will still have to decide which race-neutral policies a 
university can be judicially compelled to adopt, and which are overly burdensome on uni-
versities’ educational missions.  See supra note 265.  Hereinafter, race-neutral policies that 
can be judicially compelled (because they are not overly burdensome on universities edu-
cational missions) will be referred to as “acceptable” race-neutral policies.  The Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Fisher may shed light on which race-neutral policies, if any, are “accepta-
ble.”  However, given that UT voluntarily implemented the Top Ten Percent Law (due to 
legislative rather than judicial action), the immediate question in Fisher is not whether 
universities can be compelled to adopt a percentage plan or other race-neutral policy, but 
whether they can use race-conscious measures in addition to voluntarily-adopted race-
neutral policies which have increased diversity.  
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neutral policy to increase diversity, then a plaintiff can make the ar-
gument that such a policy has yielded sufficient diversity.  The Fisher 
Plaintiffs did this, by comparing percentages of Black and Latino stu-
dents admitted prior to Hopwood and under the Top Ten Percent 
Law, and also by comparing UT’s minority enrollment percentages 
with those of the University of Michigan Law School at the time of 
Grutter.268 
UT rebutted this claim by showing that diversity at the classroom 
level was insufficient. 
However, the Fifth Circuit did not require UT to demonstrate that 
its race-conscious policy was the least restrictive means for attaining 
sufficient diversity at the classroom level.  The panel’s analysis did lay 
out why the Top Ten Percent Law did not yield sufficient diversity—
because it disproportionately admitted minority students in certain 
majors269—but the panel did not require UT to show that its race-
conscious admissions policy explicitly aimed to admit students who 
were not admitted through the Top Ten Percent Law.  The panel re-
jected any standard higher than “good faith” for reviewing UT’s deci-
sion to implement a race-conscious admissions policy.270 
Nevertheless, a more stringent standard is certainly possible and 
practical.  As noted in Part II.B.2, Professors Ian Ayres and Sydney 
Foster argue that Grutter deviates from the traditional least restrictive 
means standard of narrow tailoring.271  Their critique centered broad-
ly on Grutter’s narrow tailoring requirements, but can also apply to 
the Fifth Circuit’s review of the need for UT’s race-conscious admis-
sions policy in Fisher.272  This Article argues that Grutter is consistent 
with a higher level of scrutiny ex post for a race-conscious policy im-
plemented after a race-neutral policy has increased diversity.273  The 
Fifth Circuit could have required UT to demonstrate that its race-
conscious policy actually made a unique contribution to diversity, be-
yond that obtained through the Top Ten Percent Law.  If courts were 
 
268 See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
269 See supra notes 218–19 and accompanying text. 
270 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 233 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Grutter teaches that so long as 
a university considers race in a holistic and individualized manner, and not as part of a 
quota or fixed-point system, courts must afford a measure of deference to the university’s 
good faith determination that certain race-conscious measures are necessary to achieve 
the educational benefits of diversity, including attaining critical mass in minority enroll-
ment.”).  The Plaintiffs in Fisher had argued for a higher standard of review.  See supra 
notes 193, 195, and accompanying text. 
271 Ayres & Foster, supra note 84. 
272 See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
273 See supra notes 266–70 and accompanying text. 
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going to enforce Grutter’s preference for race-neutral alternatives over 
race-conscious admissions policies,274 a higher standard than “good 
faith” would be necessary.  The standard proposed is a goals-means fit 
which is considered the hallmark of strict scrutiny.275 
Consistent with Justice Kennedy’s view,276 the next Part proposes 
and lays out the “unique contribution to diversity” test, which focuses 
on diversity within racial groups as a compelling interest and also 
employs strict scrutiny as the standard for reviewing the need for 
race-conscious policies to attain this interest. 
V.  UNIQUE CONTRIBUTION TO DIVERSITY:  APPLYING STRICT SCRUTINY 
IN FISHER 
This Part presents an approach to Fisher that is less deferential to 
universities than the Fifth Circuit opinion and applies strict scrutiny:  
the “unique contribution to diversity” test.  The purpose of this test is 
to assess the underlying issue raised by Fisher—whether a race-
conscious policy is necessary to attain the educational benefits of di-
versity when a race-neutral policy is in place and has increased diver-
sity.  The “unique contribution to diversity” test builds upon the ear-
lier analysis of diversity within racial groups and critical mass, but it 
does not require a court to determine whether a critical mass of mi-
nority students is present, or to define “critical mass” precisely in any 
specific numerical or other terms.  Rather than attempting to deter-
mine whether a critical mass is present, the test focuses on whether 
the race-conscious policy contributes uniquely to the educational 
benefits of diversity articulated in Grutter. 
A.  Assessing Unique Contribution to Diversity Instead of Critical Mass 
Building on the analysis of standard of review and the general dis-
cussion of within-group diversity, this Article argues that a court 
could decide Fisher by assessing whether a race-conscious admissions 
policy makes a unique, meaningful contribution to the educational 
benefits of diversity articulated in Grutter, rather than trying to de-
termine whether a critical mass of minority students is present at the 
 
274 See supra notes 107–08 and accompanying text. 
275 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
276 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 388 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The Court 
confuses deference to a university’s definition of its educational objective with deference 
to implementation of this goal.  In the context of university admissions the objective of 
racial diversity can be accepted . . . but deference is not to be given with respect to the 
methods by which it is pursued.”). 
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classroom or campus level.277  For example, in Fisher, after the Plain-
tiffs presented evidence that UT had obtained sufficient diversity via 
the race-neutral Top Ten Percent Law, UT would have to articulate 
how its race-conscious policy adds to the educational benefits beyond 
the Top Ten Percent Law, and in a manner not practical via the Top 
Ten Percent Law.  UT could do this in at least two different ways. 
1.  Unique Contribution to Representation of Different Racial Groups 
Although it was not addressed in Fisher, if UT were employing its 
race-conscious policy to admit more Native American students or any 
other underrepresented minority group, then that would show that 
the policy is making a unique contribution to the educational bene-
fits of diversity.  UT would also have to show that the Top Ten Per-
cent Law did not admit sufficient numbers of Native American stu-
dents.  This argument was not raised in Fisher, as both the Plaintiff 
and UT focused on Black and Latina/o students; nevertheless, the 
argument could be relevant in another case with similar facts. 
2.  Unique Contribution to Diversity Within Racial Groups 
UT could also show that its race-conscious policy contributed to 
diversity within racial groups, consistent with the educational benefits 
of within-group diversity and the notion of critical mass advocated in 
 
277 The “unique contribution to diversity” test articulated here could work for the Top Ten 
Percent Law or for other race-neutral admissions policies that aim to increase diversity.  
Other race-neutral policies that might increase diversity include:  consideration of appli-
cants’ socioeconomic background, first generation college status, “marked residential in-
stability” (defined in terms of moving from residence to residence frequently while grow-
ing up), geographic residency, enrollment in low-performing schools, a guaranteed 
percentile admission plan (i.e., Top Ten Percent Law), and admissions preference to all 
students (regardless of the race) at a school based on the school’s socioeconomic or ra-
cial composition.  See Guidance on the Voluntary Use of Race to Achieve Diversity in Postsecond-
ary Education, DEP’T OF JUSTICE 7 (Dec. 2, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/crt/
about/edu/documents/guidancepost.pdf [hereinafter Guidance] (discussing the Obama 
administration’s recommendations for implementation of race-conscious admissions pol-
icies and race-neutral alternatives in higher education).  The Guidance presumes these 
policies are “race-neutral.”  But see supra note 15 (noting that several commentators ques-
tion whether percentage plans are actually “race-neutral”).  Additionally, the Guidance 
recommends that institutions document their compelling interests and unique educa-
tional missions and make records of race-neutral alternatives that are considered, along 
with the reasons for rejecting those alternatives.  See Guidance at 7.  As noted earlier, Grut-
ter held that universities cannot be compelled to adopt percentage plans such as the Top 
Ten Percent Law as a substitute for race-conscious admissions policies.  See supra notes 
265 and 267.  Nevertheless, courts may have to decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether 
universities have sufficient reason to reject other race-neutral alternatives. 
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this Article.  It could have argued that its race-conscious policy was 
needed to attain more Black and Latino students in certain majors,278 
and presented evidence that the policy was actually used to admit 
students in those majors.279  UT did in fact submit evidence conveying 
the disparate enrollment of minority students in certain majors, alt-
hough its argument focused solely on numbers at the classroom level 
and did not convey the educational benefits of within-group diversity.  
Moreover, the Fifth Circuit did not predicate its ruling in Fisher on 
any such showing of evidence, applying a deferential “good faith” 
standard instead.280 
Alternatively, UT could have demonstrated that its race-conscious 
policy contributed to socioeconomic, cultural, or geographic diversity 
among Black and Latino students.281  This would also show that the 
race-conscious policy made a unique contribution to diversity—
perhaps by facilitating the admission of Black and Latino students 
with different experiences and perspectives than students admitted 
through the Top Ten Percent Law.  If the policy allowed enrollment 
of Black and Latino students from more competitive, affluent, pre-
dominantly White schools, then it would contribute to such within-
group diversity and thus to the educational benefits of diversity es-
poused in Grutter.282  UT would also have to show that the Top Ten 
Percent Law did not admit significant numbers of these students. 
 
278 The advantage of an individualized, holistic, race-conscious policy is that it does allow 
student majors and academic interests to be considered in admissions, and an admissions 
committee can target those majors that are underrepresented.  This would be more diffi-
cult with a non-individualized process, such as the Top Ten Percent Law.  See Fisher v. 
Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 240 (5th Cir. 2011) (“While the [Top Ten Percent] Law may 
have contributed to an increase in overall minority enrollment, those minority students 
remain clustered in certain programs . . . .”). 
279 One possible obstacle here is that many students switch majors after enrolling in college.  
UT might also have to show that a significant percentage of students admitted on this ba-
sis actually remained in the given majors, so that classroom benefits of diversity are actual-
ized. 
280 See supra note 270. 
281 This issue was not raised in Fisher at the district court or in the Fifth Circuit argument.  
However, in its Supreme Court brief, UT did assert that Black and Latino students admit-
ted under its race-conscious policy “have great potential for serving as a ‘bridge’ in pro-
moting cross-racial understanding, as well as in breaking down racial stereotypes.”  Brief 
for Respondents at 34, Fisher, 631 F.3d 213 (No. 11-345).  Further, UT asserted, 
“[p]etitioner’s position would forbid UT from considering . . .  a [high-achieving, affluent 
Black or Latino] student’s race in holistic review as well, even though admission of such a 
student could help dispel stereotypical assumptions (which actually may be reinforced by 
the top 10% plan) by increasing diversity within diversity.”  Id. (emphasis in original). 
282 See supra Parts I.C. and II.C.  As noted earlier, one common stereotype of Black and Lati-
no students is that all of these students come from poor, inner-city backgrounds, and if 
UT’s race-conscious policy does indeed target the noted population, then it serves direct-
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UT could also demonstrate that its race-conscious policy contrib-
uted to within-group diversity in some other unique way.283  So long as 
the educational benefits of diversity obtained by enrolling these stu-
dents were consistent with those articulated in Grutter, and the group 
of students targeted could not readily be admitted in sufficient num-
bers via the Top Ten Percent Law, the race-conscious policy would be 
constitutional. 
3.  What Would be the Result in Fisher? 
If the Supreme Court adopted the “unique contribution to diver-
sity” test, it would vacate the Fifth Circuit ruling in Fisher, but it would 
not declare UT’s race-conscious policy to be unconstitutional.  Ra-
ther, it would remand the case for review based on the more strin-
gent standard proposed here.  The eventual result would be an open 
question, dependent on UT’s ability to demonstrate that its race-
conscious policy makes a unique contribution to diversity, above and 
beyond the Top Ten Percent Law.284  Consistent with strict scrutiny, 
UT’s race-conscious policy would have to be narrowly tailored to fit 
the compelling interest of attaining within-group diversity and its ed-
ucational benefits. 
 
ly to break down this racial stereotype and thus to help attain the educational benefits of 
diversity noted in Grutter.  See supra note 226. 
283 For example, Professors Kevin Brown and Jeannine Bell advocate for universities to dis-
tinguish between different Black groups, such as Black immigrants (from Africa and the 
Caribbean), multiracial persons, Black Latinos, and African Americans when implement-
ing their race-conscious admissions policies.  See Brown & Bell, supra note 7, at 1230–31.  
Additionally, the Pew Hispanic Center has published reports detailing diversity within La-
tina/o populations in the U.S.  See, e.g., Seth Motel & Eileen Patten, Hispanic Origin Pro-
files, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, June 27, 2012, available at 
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/06/27/country-of-origin-profiles/  (noting that 
“[t]here are differences across [Latina/o] groups in the share of each that is foreign 
born, holds citizenship (by birth or naturalization) and is proficient in English.  They are 
also of varying age, tend to live in different areas within the U.S. and have varying levels 
of education, homeownership, income and poverty”).  Similarly, the White House Initia-
tive on Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders (“AAPI”) has emphasized the significance 
of diversity within AAPI groups.  See also Arelis Hernandez, Spreading the Word on Asian 
American Diversity, DIVERSE ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUC. (June 23, 2010), 
http://diverseeducation.com/article/13904c4/spreading-the-word-on-asian-american-
diversity.html (“For Kiran Ahuja, the executive director of the White House Initiative on 
Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders (AAPI), communicating an accurate picture of 
Asian American diversity to policymakers across the federal government represents a 
fundamental task . . . .”). 
284 As noted earlier, UT does assert in its Supreme Court brief that its race-conscious policy 
adds to diversity within racial groups.  See supra notes 183 and 281.  This Article argues, 
however, that UT must go beyond mere assertion and actually demonstrate that it uses 
race in a manner to actually attain within group diversity and its educational benefits. 
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B.  Limiting Principle on Race-Conscious Policies to Attain Diversity 
One question left open by the “unique contribution to diversity” 
test is what is the limiting principle on race-conscious policies to at-
tain diversity?  The test itself does not place an upper limit on the use 
of race-conscious admissions policies, because there are an infinite 
number of diverse viewpoints.  In theory, a university could always use 
race to admit students with different viewpoints, even if vast racial 
and within-group diversity already exists within the admitted class of 
students.  What then is the limiting principle for the use of race?285 
There are at least two possible answers to that question:  1. The 
point of diminishing return for the educational benefits of diversity; 
and 2. The overall, aggregate weight given to race in the admissions 
process.  Although both are generally consistent with Grutter, the lat-
ter makes more sense in light of the issues raised in this Article. 
1.  Point of Diminishing Returns for the Educational Benefits of Diversity 
Inclusion of more diverse perspectives can always add to the edu-
cational experience.  However, there are diminishing returns to edu-
cational benefits of diversity.  Given the time and space constraints, 
students cannot experience all perspectives and educational oppor-
tunities that might be available in classrooms and on campuses more 
generally.  As noted earlier in Part II, race-conscious policies have 
costs.  At some point, the stigmatic harm and other costs associated 
with race-conscious admissions policies begin to outweigh any addi-
tional benefits of diversity—and one interpretation of Grutter is that 
beyond this point, it does not allow further consideration of race.286 
While this analysis is logically consistent with the theory of Grutter 
articulated in this Article, it runs into a practical problem.  It would 
be no easier for a court to determine the point of diminishing re-
turns for the educational benefits of diversity than it would to deter-
mine if a critical mass is present;287 either determination is highly sub-
 
285 See also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498 (1989) (rejecting “race-
based decisionmaking [that is] essentially limitless . . . .”). 
286 Cf. Ayres & Foster, supra note 84 (arguing that courts should conduct a cost-benefit analy-
sis of race-conscious admission policies).  This Article does not contend that the Grutter 
majority itself viewed critical mass in terms of such a cost-benefit analysis.  Rather, the 
contention here is that the diversity/stigmatic harm calculus noted here can be inferred 
from Grutter’s narrow tailoring principles and its notion of “critical mass.” 
287 In one sense, determining the point of critical mass is the same as determining the point 
of diminishing returns for the educational benefits of diversity.  When there is a critical 
mass present, enrolled through the type of admissions process that Grutter envisions, the 
educational benefits of diversity (racial and within-group) can outweigh, by the greatest 
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jective and context-dependent.  Moreover, Grutter has other provi-
sions which may be more practical and may also create a lower bound 
for the use of race-conscious policies—by limiting the weight that can 
be placed on race in the admissions process. 
2.  Aggregate Weight of Race in Admissions 
Regardless of the educational benefits of diversity, there may be 
an upper limit on race-conscious admissions policies based on the to-
tal aggregate weight that can be given to race in the admissions pro-
cess. Since Grutter mandates that race be used in a flexible, non-
mechanical fashion, based on individualized review,288 there is no sys-
tematic weight of race for individual applicants in a constitutional, 
holistic admissions plan.  However, the weight of race in aggregate—
for all applicants in a given admissions cycle—can be measured, 289 
and this aggregate weight can be compared to a designated limit that 
is determined by courts.  Two provisions in Grutter suggest that there 
is such a limit.  First, the Grutter majority opinion notes that 
“[n]arrow tailoring . . . requires that a race-conscious admissions pro-
gram not unduly harm members of any racial group.”290  While this 
 
extent possible, the stigmatic harms, reinforcement of stereotypes, and other costs creat-
ed by race-conscious policies necessary to attain that diversity.  In this way, one can think 
of Grutter’s critical mass concept and narrow tailoring requirements as joint provisions to 
maximize the breakdown of racial stereotypes and promote cross-racial understanding—
taking into account both the educational benefits of diversity and the costs of race-
conscious policies. 
288 See supra Part II.B.1. 
289 In Grutter, the Plaintiffs made an argument based on the aggregate weight of race in the 
admissions process.  The Grutter Plaintiffs used data on the undergraduate GPAs and Law 
School Admissions Test (“LSAT”) scores of accepted and rejected applicants to the Uni-
versity of Michigan School from 1995 to 2000, all sorted by race, and calculated the odds 
of acceptance for members of each group.  Part of the basis for their argument was that 
after statistically controlling for academic criteria and other variables, Black, Latino, and 
Native American applicants had a much higher probability of being accepted to the Law 
School than White and Asian American applicants.  See Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 
2d 821, 838–39 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (Plaintiffs’ expert witness concluding “that ‘[a]ll the 
graphs comparing Native American, African American, Mexican American, and Puerto 
Rican applicants to Caucasian American applicants show wide separation indicating a 
much higher probability of acceptance for the particular ethnic group at a given selection 
index value’”).  But see Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy:  Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic of 
Selective Admissions, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1049 (2002) (“In any admissions process 
where applicants greatly outnumber admittees, and where white applicants greatly out-
number minority applicants, substantial preferences for minority applicants will not sig-
nificantly diminish the odds of admission facing white applicants.” (cited in Gratz v. Bol-
linger, 539 U.S. 244, 303 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)). 
290 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341 (2003). 
Nov. 2012] DIVERSITY WITHIN RACIAL GROUPS 529 
 
provision could be interpreted to limit the weight placed on race,291 
Grutter held that “in the context of its individualized inquiry into the 
possible diversity contributions of all applicants, the [University of 
Michigan’s] Law School’s race-conscious admissions program does 
not unduly harm nonminority applicants.”292  If the Supreme Court 
follows this standard in Fisher, then undue burden will not be an is-
sue:  all parties concede that the weight given to race in UT under-
graduate admissions is less than that upheld in Grutter for the Univer-
sity of Michigan Law School admissions program.293 
Second, and perhaps more important when Fisher goes before the 
Court and particularly Justice Kennedy, race cannot be the “predom-
inant” factor in the admission of any applicants.  As Justice Kennedy 
stated in his Grutter dissent: 
There is no constitutional objection to the goal of considering race as 
one modest factor among many others to achieve diversity, but an educa-
tional institution must ensure . . . that race does not become a predomi-
nant factor in the admissions decisionmaking.294 
Nevertheless, while noting that a weight requirement could be 
read into Grutter’s individualized consideration requirement,295 Pro-
fessors Ayres and Foster contend that “the Grutter Court failed to offer 
a theory for where the line should be drawn between programs that 
weight race too heavily and those that do not.”296 
This Article agrees that the allowable weight given to race, in ag-
gregate, needs to be clarified to provide a limiting principle for Grut-
ter-like admissions plans.  A full consideration of the aggregate weight 
of race in a holistic admissions process is beyond the scope of this Ar-
 
291 See Ayres & Foster, supra note 84, at 558 (contending that “evidence that the Grutter Court 
viewed the weight inquiry to be part of the individualized consideration inquiry comes in 
its discussion of the requirement that the affirmative action plan not unduly burden third 
parties”).  Ayres and Foster further note that “the no-undue-burden requirement [is] . . . 
a requirement that is related to the weight given to race in admissions . . . .”  Id. 
292 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341. 
293 See Brief of Appellees at 18, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213 (2012) (noting that 
“UT’s holistic consideration of race is even more modest than the policy upheld in Grut-
ter”).  See also Fisher v. Texas, 556 F. Supp. 2d 603, 608 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (noting that “UT 
considers race in its admissions process as a factor of a factor of a factor of a factor”). 
294 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 392–93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  See also supra Part I.C.1. (arguing 
that perhaps the University of Michigan Law School could not admit more Native Ameri-
can applicants without making race the predominant factor in admissions). 
295 See Ayres & Foster, supra note 84, at 558. 
296 Id.  Judge Garza’s dissent in Fisher also contends that the weight of race preferences is a 
necessary element for meaningful judicial review.  See Fisher, 631 F.3d at 251 (Garza, J., 
specially concurring) (noting that in Grutter, “the weight given to race as part of this indi-
vidualized consideration is purposefully left undefined, making meaningful judicial re-
view all but impossible”). 
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ticle.297  Moreover, although the Supreme Court could address this is-
sue if it revisits Grutter, it is not the immediate issue at play in Fisher 
itself:  all parties concede that the weight given to race in UT under-
graduate admissions is less than that upheld in Grutter for the Univer-
sity of Michigan Law School admissions program.298  The purpose of 
the discussion here is just to show how an upper bound on the aggre-
gate weight of race in an admissions process can be a limiting princi-
ple for the “unique contribution to diversity” test, and for race-
conscious admissions more generally.299 
C.  Advantages of a “Unique Contribution to Diversity” Test 
The “unique contribution to diversity” test described here has sev-
eral advantages over a direct assessment of “critical mass.”  It directly 
addresses the critiques of the Grutter majority presented in Justice 
Kennedy’s dissent and the critiques of the Fisher panel opinion pre-
sented in Chief Judge Jones’s dissent,300 and it also helps to resolve 
other dilemmas faced by judges and advocates trying to interpret and 
apply Grutter. 
1.  Ground for Judicial Review and Application of Strict Scrutiny 
The “unique contribution to diversity” test directly addresses Jus-
tice Kennedy’s concern, raised in his Grutter dissent, that:  
“[C]ourts . . . apply a searching standard to race-based admissions 
schemes, that would force educational institutions to seriously ex-
plore race-neutral alternatives [rather than] . . . be satisfied by . . . 
profession of its . . . ‘good faith.’”301  It also quells Chief Judge Jones’s 
critique by offering “ground for serious judicial review of terminus of 
the racial preference policy.”302  The test articulated requires a precise 
fit between goals and means—characteristic of strict scrutiny.  UT or 
 
297 The Grutter Plaintiffs’ argument, supra note 285, provides some indication of how aggre-
gate weight of race might be measured, notwithstanding Professor Liu’s critique.  
298 See supra note 293. 
299 An upper bound on the aggregate weight of race could also be useful in gradually phas-
ing out race-conscious policies.  Plaintiffs in future cases could argue for reduction of the 
allowable upper bound, based on demographic changes, development of race-neutral 
admissions strategies, or other developments that increase minority enrollment.  See infra 
Part V.C.3. 
300 See supra notes 169–71. 
301 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 394 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. (noting the 
“necessity for scrutiny that is real, not feigned, where the . . . category of race is a factor in 
decisionmaking”). 
302 Fisher v. Texas, 644 F.3d 301, 308 (5th Cir. 2011) (Jones, C.J., dissenting). 
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another university could not just claim that underrepresentation of 
minorities in particular majors justifies its race-conscious policy; it 
would have to show that the race-conscious policy in question actually 
targets and admits minority students in those given majors.  The same 
would be true if the university contended that the race-conscious pol-
icy contributed to within-group socioeconomic or geographic diversi-
ty.303 
The proposal here balances various interests, giving universities 
freedom to pursue different admissions strategies, which use race in 
accordance with Grutter’s provisions, while also holding them ac-
countable to Grutter’s preference for race-neutral admissions policies.  
In doing so, it adopts a standard of review similar in stringency to that 
advocated by the Fisher plaintiffs.304  However, unlike the “strong basis 
in evidence” standard, which is a “backward-looking attempt to rem-
edy past wrongs,”305 the “unique contribution to diversity” test focuses 
on “working forward from some demonstration of the level of diversi-
ty that provides the purported benefits.”306  The test applies strict 
scrutiny to review the need for race-conscious policies to attain diver-
sity when a race-neutral policy has been or could be effective in in-
creasing diversity.  It requires a university to demonstrate the utility of 
a race-conscious policy if:  1. A race-neutral policy is in place that sig-
nificantly increases diversity; or 2. A plaintiff provides sufficient evi-
dence that an acceptable race-neutral policy would result in levels of 
diversity comparable to the race-conscious policy in question.307  
“Good faith” would apply only when there is not sufficient evidence 
 
303 Of course, students often change majors while in college, and this could provide a basis 
for counterargument.  Socioeconomic and geographic diversity within racial groups are 
not malleable after admission in this way and thus might be more viable bases for race-
conscious policies. 
304 See supra notes 193–92 and accompanying text. 
305 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 233 (5th Cir. 2011). 
306 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 705 (2007). 
307 Such evidence might be data that convincingly shows how an acceptable race-neutral pol-
icy would increase diversity at a particular institution.  The reason to allow such evidence 
to invoke more stringent review is to ensure that universities have incentive to explore 
race-neutral alternatives to their race-conscious admissions policies—a particular concern 
of Justice Kennedy.  See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 394 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dis-
senting) (“Were the courts to apply a searching standard to race-based admissions 
schemes, that would force educational institutions to seriously explore race-neutral alter-
natives.”).  However, courts would still have to determine which race-neutral policies are 
acceptable and do not overly compromise universities’ educational missions.  See supra 
notes 265 and 267.  In the absence of convincing evidence that an acceptable race-neutral 
policy would produce sufficient diversity, courts would accept universities’ “good faith” 
determination that race-conscious policies are necessary, as dictated by Grutter. 
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presented to raise a question about the need for race-conscious poli-
cies to attain the educational benefits of diversity.308 
Additionally, while the “unique contribution to diversity” test re-
quires a goals-means fit for race-conscious admissions policies, it does 
not place an overwhelming burden on universities to accomplish this 
end.  Institutions of higher education have or can readily obtain all of 
the data necessary to demonstrate how their race-conscious policies 
contribute to the educational benefits of diversity.  Colleges and uni-
versities may need to collect more demographic data on diversity 
within racial groups, and also to structure their race-conscious admis-
sions policies more carefully to make sure those policies make a 
“unique contribution to diversity.”  However, there is no barrier that 
would prevent these institutions from readily doing so.309 
2.  Assessing the Unique (Even if Minimal) Impact of Race-Conscious 
Policies 
The “unique contribution to diversity” test also addresses Chief 
Judge Jones’s contention that the race-conscious policy has a minimal 
impact;310 in fact, the test focuses on whether the race-conscious poli-
cy does have a meaningful, unique impact.  It is possible that a race-
conscious policy that admits only a small number of minority students 
can have a meaningful, unique impact if those students add to the di-
versity of viewpoints and experiences in a manner beyond the race-
neutral policy.311  The admission of even small numbers of African 
 
308 In such a case, a court would only review if the race-conscious policy conformed to Grut-
ter’s narrow tailoring principles; it would presume “good faith” on the university’s part re-
garding the need for the race-conscious policy. 
309 These measures may cause institutions to incur more costs, but colleges and universities 
have adjusted to similar circumstances in the past:  after Grutter, institutions had to ex-
pend more resources on holistic admissions and eliminate more cost-effective point sys-
tems similar to the one struck down in Gratz.  See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 
(2003) (“Respondents contend that ‘[t]he volume of applications and the presentation of 
applicant information make it impractical for [LSA] to use the . . . admissions system’ 
upheld by the Court today in Grutter . . . But the fact that the implementation of a pro-
gram capable of providing individualized consideration might present administrative 
challenges does not render constitutional an otherwise problematic system.” (internal ci-
tation omitted)). 
310 See supra note 169 and accompanying text.  
311 In its Supreme Court brief, UT also argued that “[t]he nuanced and modest impact of 
race under UT’s holistic review plan is . . . a constitutional virtue, not a vice.”  Brief for 
Respondents at 36, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F. 3d 213, (2011) (No. 11-345).  Addition-
ally, during the Fisher oral argument, Justice Kennedy noted that he “had trouble with” 
the Plaintiffs’ argument “that the University’s race-conscious admission plan is not neces-
sary . . . because it admits . . . so few minorities.”  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 
1, at 22.  But see Ayres & Foster, supra note 84, at 523 n.27  (“At least as a theoretical mat-
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American and Latina/o students from certain majors, or from more 
competitive schools, would be justifiable if minority students in those 
majors were not admitted sufficiently via the Top Ten Percent Law, as 
would the admission of small numbers of Native American students 
via a race-conscious admissions policy. 
3.  Proper Application of Grutter’s “Sunset” Requirement 
The “unique contribution to diversity” test also provides a reason-
able path to apply Grutter’s sunset provision and eventually phase out 
race-conscious admissions policies.312  The Fisher litigation and ruling 
seemed to presume that once a particular critical mass is attained, a 
university would immediately have to stop using race-conscious ad-
missions policies.  Grutter stated that institutions should periodically 
review whether race-conscious admissions policies are necessary, with 
the goal of phasing them out in favor of race-neutral alternatives to 
attain diversity.313  However, this cannot occur all at once when a par-
 
ter, narrow tailoring requires not only that preferences not be too large, but also that they 
not be too small so as to fail to achieve the goals of the relevant compelling government 
interest.”).  Professors Ayres and Foster’s contention does not apply to race-conscious 
admissions policies in higher education for two reasons: 1. Even a small increase in diver-
sity could have meaningful educational benefits; 2. Having one or two students from a 
given racial group may be significantly better than having none—particularly if those stu-
dents are vocal in class or active on campus.  In his Constitutional Law course at NYU 
Law, Professor Derrick Bell jokingly referred to Turquoise Young, a Black female student 
who always voiced her opinions, as a “critical mass of one.”  Professor Bell noted that in 
some of his classes, one or two vocal students had a tremendous impact on class discus-
sions—although he acknowledged that this did not always happen.  The variable and un-
predictable nature of classroom dynamics is another reason why critical mass is difficult to 
measure.  See supra Part I.C.3. 2.  As a practical matter, in a holistic admissions system that 
is in compliance with Grutter (i.e., which uses race as a flexible, unquantified plus factor), 
such minimal use of race would be difficult to detect.  Cf. Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. 
Harris, The New Racial Preferences, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1139, 1146 (2008) (raising “the ques-
tion of whether race can in fact be eliminated from admissions processes”); Daniel N. 
Lipson, Embracing Diversity:  The Institutionalization of Affirmative Action as Diversity Manage-
ment At UC-Berkeley, UT-Austin, and UW-Madison, 32 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 985, 1015 (2007) 
(noting that “the line between race-based and race-blind policy making can be quite blur-
ry”).  There is no way to completely eliminate race from a holistic admissions process, as 
information about an applicant’s race may be present throughout the application via per-
sonal statements, student group membership, and even names which are correlated with 
group membership.  In a “race-neutral” legal regime, plaintiffs might be able to prove 
significant use of race with statistics, but they would have a very difficult time proving or 
even detecting minimal usage. 
312 This point also addresses Chief Justice Roberts’s question during the Fisher oral argument 
at the Supreme Court about the “logical end point” of race-conscious admissions policies.  
See supra note 172.  
313 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003).  (“[R]ace-conscious admissions policies 
must be limited in time . . . [i]n the context of higher education, the durational require-
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ticular critical mass is attained; in fact, this Article has argued that 
neither courts nor universities can precisely define critical mass or 
determine when a critical mass is present.314  Rather, the implementa-
tion of race-neutral alternatives should be an incremental process.  
Grutter’s “sunset” requirement is best interpreted to require a gradual 
reduction of race-conscious policies in favor of race-neutral admis-
sion policies “as they develop.”315  The “unique contribution to diver-
sity” test provides a means for universities to gradually phase out use 
of race in admissions, and for courts to review this process as neces-
sary.  Eventually, this process would lead to the elimination of race-
conscious policies altogether, as espoused by Grutter, and the test ar-
ticulated here provides a means for universities and for courts to as-
sess, at any given time, to what extent their race-conscious policies are 
necessary to attain the educational benefits of diversity. 
 4.  Continued Constitutional Viability of Race-Conscious Admissions 
Policies 
Although the “unique contribution to diversity” test holds univer-
sities to a more stringent standard to justify their use of race than the 
Fifth Circuit’s “good faith” standard, it will allow race-conscious ad-
missions policies to be constitutionally viable for longer.  The Su-
preme Court is likely to narrow Grutter’s doctrine on race-conscious 
admissions,316 and the “unique contribution to diversity” test allows 
for this without compromising the enrollment of minority students.  
This is probably the best that proponents of affirmative action can 
hope for on the current Supreme Court.317 
 
ment can be met by sunset provisions in race-conscious admissions policies and periodic 
reviews to determine whether racial preferences are still necessary to achieve student 
body diversity.”). 
314 See supra Part I.C.3. 
315 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342 (“Universities . . . can and should draw on the most promising 
aspects of . . . race-neutral alternatives as they develop.”).  This also reinforces the point 
in Part V.C.2 that race-conscious policies with a small impact can still be constitutional:  
one would expect a gradual reduction in the use of these policies if indeed universities 
are seeking to apply race-neutral alternatives. 
316 See supra note 7. 
317 Professor Derrick Bell used to warn students in his Constitutional Law course not to “let 
the perfect be the enemy of the good.”  For advocates of affirmative action, the proposal 
in this Article is certainly not perfect, but compared to overturning Grutter altogether, it is 
good. 
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5.  Highlighting Justice Kennedy’s Values Conflict:  Predicating Diversity 
on Segregation 
Finally, the “unique contribution to diversity” test can address an 
ironic twist in Fisher—one that speaks to a values conflict in Justice 
Kennedy’s jurisprudence and in American society more generally.  In 
Grutter, the Supreme Court recognized the educational benefits of di-
versity as a compelling interest, and even in dissent, Justice Kennedy 
recognized this interest318 and reiterated it in Parents Involved in Com-
munity Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.319  Additionally, in Parents 
Involved, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence noted that “[a] compelling 
interest exists in avoiding racial isolation,”320—a notion that would 
presumably be joined by four other Justices.321  If in Fisher, the Court 
precludes UT from using race-conscious admissions, it would essen-
tially be saying that the Top Ten Percent Law—a policy that increases 
minority representation only because of racial isolation in Texas pub-
lic high schools322—prevents UT from using race to pursue the educa-
tional benefits of diversity. 
This would be an ironic and unfortunate result.  The “unique 
contribution to diversity” test allows Justice Kennedy to impose strict 
scrutiny—thus satisfying his misgivings in Grutter323—while still pre-
serving UT’s ability to use narrowly tailored race-conscious admis-
sions policies. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has analyzed and elaborated upon the role of diversity 
within racial groups in determining the constitutionality of race-
conscious admissions policies.  It has done so in the context of Grutter 
and Fisher, with an eye towards Justice Kennedy’s impending vote in 
the latter.  The theory of critical mass presented here reflects the 
 
318 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387–88 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Our precedents provide a basis for 
the Court’s acceptance of a university’s considered judgment that racial diversity among 
students can further its educational task . . . .” ). 
319 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 791 (2007) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring) (“As the Court notes, we recognized the compelling nature of the 
interest in . . . diversity in higher education in Grutter.”). 
320 Id. at 797. 
321 Justice Kagan recused herself in Fisher, but she along with Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and 
Sotomayor would likely agree with Justice Kennedy here.  See supra note 3. 
322 See supra note 223. 
323 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 395 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“If the Court abdicates its constitutional 
duty to give strict scrutiny to the use of race in university admissions, it negates my au-
thority to approve the use of race in pursuit of student diversity.”). 
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compelling interest of breaking down racial stereotypes that is articu-
lated in Grutter, and that logically coheres with Grutter’s narrow tailor-
ing principles and the need for deference to universities.  By analyz-
ing these issues, this Article explicates the principle that race-
conscious admissions policies can aim not only to increase represen-
tation of particular groups of minority students, but also to attain di-
versity with racial groups. 
Further, in its analysis of Fisher, this Article addresses the scope of 
deference given to universities with respect to race-conscious admis-
sions policies.  It distinguishes deference on three issues:  implemen-
tation, educational objective, and need, and delineates how standards 
of review are different for each.  The Article builds upon its earlier 
analysis of critical mass to propose a tangible test for courts to evalu-
ate the constitutionality of race-conscious admissions policies when 
race-neutral alternatives are in place, or when a plaintiff convincingly 
demonstrates that acceptable race neutral policies may work as well as 
race-conscious policies.  The “unique contribution to diversity” test 
proposed here focuses not on whether a critical mass is present on 
campus or in particular classrooms; rather, it centers more immedi-
ately on whether the race-conscious policy in question makes a tangi-
ble, meaningful contribution to the diversity of perspectives and ex-
periences on campus, beyond the race-neutral policies that are in 
place.  This test addresses the issues raised by Justice Kennedy in his 
Grutter dissent and the critiques of Fisher posed by Chief Judge Jones 
in her dissent to the en banc denial.324  The “unique contribution to 
diversity” test also provides an interpretation of Grutter that allows 
strict scrutiny rather than “good faith” to apply in a case like Fisher. 
Finally, this Article highlights the values conflict in Fisher—the 
problem of predicating campus diversity on school segregation 
through the Top Ten Percent Law.  This conflict will be one that Jus-
tice Kennedy will grapple with when determining his vote in Fisher.  It 
is also one aspect of a larger contradiction in America:  the desire for 
an anti-essentialist, colorblind society without the will to tangibly ad-
dress the rampant racial inequalities that exist in this country.  Af-
firmative action in higher education is just one small manifestation of 
this dilemma, which is certain to appear again and again in American 
law and politics.  It would be an ironic and unfortunate twist if the 
Court were to rule in a manner that predicates diversity in higher ed-
ucation on racial segregation in K-12 schooling, which has actually 
 
324 See supra notes 169–73 and accompanying text. 
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been increasing for the past twenty-five years.325  But more immediate-
ly, it is important to highlight this conflict in Justice Kennedy’s own 
jurisprudence,326 as he will likely cast the deciding vote. 
 
 
325 See, e.g., Gary Orfield & Chungmei Lee, Historical Reversals, Accelerating Resegregation, and 
the Need for New Integration Strategies, A Report of the Civil Rights Project/Proyecto 
Derechos Civiles, UCLA (2007), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/
research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/historic-reversals-accelerating-
resegregation-and-the-need-for-new-integration-strategies-1/orfield-historic-reversals-
accelerating.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2012). 
326 See Gerken, supra note 6, for an excellent analysis of Justice Kennedy’s evolving race and 
equal protection jurisprudence. 
